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ABSTRACT 
MULTIPLE GROUP RELATIONS: 
MAINTAINING BALANCE THROUGH INDIRECT CONTACT EFFECTS 
MAY 2014 
DIALA R. HAWI, B.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT 
M.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Linda Tropp 
Most research on intergroup relations has focused on two groups, whereby one group’s 
attitudes toward another group may change as a result of their contact experiences with 
that other group.  Yet in real life settings, contexts in which groups come into contact are 
likely to involve multiple groups.  This research argues that attitudes and perceptions that 
members of one group form about another group depend not only on their direct contact 
experiences with that group, but also on their relationship with third-party groups, and the 
perceived relationships that third-party groups have with the other group. The present 
research uses structural balance theory as a guiding framework, and emerging intergroup 
research on indirect contact effects, to examine these processes in multi-group contexts.  
First, a field survey study in Lebanon examined how Lebanese contact with and attitudes 
toward Palestinians (third party) would predict their attitudes toward Israelis. Next, a 
laboratory experiment was conducted at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, to test 
whether multi-group relations and effects would follow similar patterns in an 
experimental setting. Results show evidence of some third party influence, and these 
findings and their implications are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history and in many parts of the world, intergroup conflict has been 
maintained and perpetuated through established group structures rather than direct events 
and interactions. For instance, one group’s transgression against another may elicit a 
hostile and violent response by the latter group if there exists a history or structurally 
established negative relation between the two groups, or it may elicit a more tolerant 
response if the established relationship has generally been a positive one. However, when 
the state of the intergroup relationship is yet to be established or is susceptible to change, 
groups may look to their allies and enemies to inform their attitudes, responses, and 
future relations. The project described in this paper examines these issues using theories 
and methods from the social psychological literature, as well as other work from the 
fields of political science, anthropology, history, international relations, and public 
policy. 
In social psychology, much attention has been dedicated to studies of intergroup 
contact that assess perceptions and attitudes of one group towards members of another 
group (e.g., Ata, Bastian, & Lusher, 2009; Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Psaltis, 
Schmid, Popan, Cairns, & Hughes, 2010). Extensive research has illustrated the positive 
effects that can be gained from contact between groups in terms of improving intergroup 
attitudes and changing perceptions of and expectations for contact with outgroup 
members (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Until very recently, most studies have typically 
examined the relationship between two groups, even though political relations around the 
world often involve more than two parties that shape the dynamics of war and peace. In 
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these real world settings, where more than two groups exist, how would the structure of 
these relations be shaped?  Would the presence of a “third” group influence one’s 
attitudes toward and relations with other groups? Furthermore, in current peace-building 
efforts, programs that are designed to improve relations or end conflict between two 
groups may be neglecting the potential influence a third group may have on the impact of 
such a program, or inversely, the impact that this program might have on relations with 
that third group. This research project aims to uncover the potential influence of an 
outside third party on relations between two groups, and in shaping the make-up of the 
political and psychological dynamics that occur between multiple groups. It proposes that 
the direction of this influence depends on how individuals perceive the third-party group 
relating to others. In other words, indirect channels, such as third-party influence, may 
exert positive or negative influences on intergroup attitudes and relations. 
The intergroup dynamics that occur when more than two groups are involved has 
been quite understudied in the field of social psychology. Given the reality of having 
multiple groups in single settings, this research proposes that our experiences vis-à-vis 
one group can influence our attitudes towards another group, depending on how we 
perceive these different groups relating to one another. Balance Theory (Heider, 1958; 
originally a theory of interpersonal relations), Image Theory (Hermann, 1999; rooted in 
political science), and emerging intergroup literatures – Secondary Transfer Effects 
(Pettigrew, 2008) and Extended Contact Effects (Wright et al., 1997) – provide guiding 
frameworks to examine these influences in multi-group contexts.   
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Direct Contact Effects 
One of the most frequently studied strategies to improve intergroup relations 
grows from the intergroup contact hypothesis, articulated more than a half-century ago 
(Allport, 1954; Williams, 1947). The hypothesis proposes that under optimal conditions 
where groups interact cooperatively as equals and with institutional support, contact can 
foster positive attitudes between members of different groups (Pettigrew, 1986; Pettigrew 
& Tropp, 2006; Sigelman & Welch, 1993). Allport (1954) proposed that when group 
members get to know each other through such contact, positive attitudes begin to replace 
old prejudices, and extend from the individuals involved in the contact to the larger 
groups to which they belong.  Thus, the significance of the intergroup contact hypothesis 
lies in the generalizability of its effects to the outgroup as a whole (Pettigrew, 1998).  
Although most research on contact theory has focused on positive conditions and 
effects of contact, there remains an unexplored – yet equally relevant – need to study 
negative effects of intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).  Negative conditions or 
experiences in contact with individual outgroup members can potentially lead to 
increased negative attitudes towards the entire outgroup (e.g, Paolini, Harwood, & Rubin, 
2010; Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000).   
Balance Theory and Its Application to Intergroup Contexts 
The need for a dual focus on positive and negative dimensions of contact can be 
further informed by Heider’s (1958) balance theory.  According to Heider (1958), people 
are motivated to maintain balance and consistency in their attitudes and relations. For 
example, to avoid imbalances, people may feel compelled to like others whom their friends 
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also like, or reject those who are disliked by their friends. One way to look at this is 
through these commonly known formulas: 
My friend’s friend is my friend 
My friend’s enemy is my enemy 
My enemy’s friend is my enemy 
My enemy’s enemy is my friend 
  Within a single group, two individuals can achieve a state of balance if both 
individuals either embrace or reject their group membership, as long as they have positive 
attitudes toward or relations with each other (Heider, 1958). In intergroup contexts, 
groups may also feel compelled to rely on their enemies and allies when forming 
relations with other relevant groups. In line with this argument, the literature in political 
science shows that relational imbalances in international affairs increase the likelihood of 
conflict (Maoz, Terris, Kuperman, Talmud, 1997). Furthermore, research by Zhong and 
colleagues (2008) suggests that a “state of balance is achieved when two parties both like 
or dislike a third party” (p. 794). Thus, two groups are more likely to bond over their 
common dislike of a third group. A historical account provided by Duara (1997) 
illustrates this phenomenon. Although Iranians (mostly Shiites) initially distinguished 
themselves from other Muslim sects (e.g., Sunni), these negative sentiments dissolved 
following the Arab-Israeli war. With the emergence of a new common enemy (Israel), 
conflict between Shiites and Sunnis was eventually replaced by Muslim solidarity. 
Therefore, the existence of third parties could impact the creation of common attitudes 
and cooperative relations between groups. 
However, the explanation provided by Zhong et al. (2008) does not account for all 
the processes involved in maintaining multigroup balance. It is possible that regardless of 
whether groups share a common dislike (or liking) of a third party, it is the quality of 
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contact and experiences with the third party that could influence attitudes and relations 
that one group develops toward a target outgroup. This research contributes to the 
existing literature and to the fields of social psychology and international relations by 
incorporating balance theory with two potential intergroup mechanisms relevant to 
indirect contact effects – secondary transfer and extended contact. 
Indirect Effects of Intergroup Contact 
In some contexts where direct contact is not feasible, group members may rely on 
indirect means to establish and understand intergroup relations. For groups that are 
segregated or countries that have limited or no direct channels of communication with 
each other, their relations and intergroup attitudes are likely to be influenced by these 
indirect contact effects (Dovidio, Eller, & Hewstone, 2011). Therefore, indirect contact 
could play a strong role in shaping group members’ attitudes and behaviors toward other 
groups. Although the literature on indirect contact effects remains limited (Dovidio et al., 
2011), I propose that some processes, such as those involved in secondary transfer and 
extended contact are relevant to understanding how balance theory may function at the 
group level. Secondary transfer effects (Pettigrew, 2009) refer to contact’s effects in 
shifting intergroup attitudes to groups not directly involved in the contact. Extended 
contact effects (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997) refer to how 
knowledge of others’ contact experiences can affect one’s attitudes and relations toward 
other groups. The section below describes these two indirect mechanisms as studied 
within the social psychological literature on intergroup relations.  
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Secondary Transfer Processes 
Recent studies have explored how intergroup contact affects attitudes not only 
toward groups with whom contact occurred, but also toward other groups not directly 
involved in any form of contact. Pettigrew (2009) describes the secondary transfer effect 
as when positive attitudes resulting from contact with one group can transfer to other 
groups. For example, Tausch and colleagues (2010) found that Catholics and Protestants 
who had contact in Belfast not only showed more positive attitudes toward each other, 
but also these attitudes generalized to racial minorities as well. Therefore, group members 
transferred their attitudes from a third party onto outgroups not directly involved in the 
contact. A longitudinal study in the U.S. demonstrated the robustness of this effect, 
whereby college students reported less prejudice toward their roommate’s ethnic group 
over time, as well as toward other ethnic groups beyond their own (Van Laar, Levin, 
Sinclair, & Sidanius, 2005). 
In the examples presented above, attitudes were assumed to transfer from one 
group to the other, based on the level of similarity between these two groups (Pettigrew, 
2009). However, it is possible that even when two groups share similarities, they could 
have negative relations with each other. According to image theory, enemy relations are 
in fact established when two groups do not share compatible goals, even though they may 
share similar status and/or power (Alexander, Brewer, & Livingston, 2005). In addition, 
an enemy is defined by a state as one whose intentions or actions are seen as threatening 
that state’s interests (Maoz, Terris, Kuperman, & Talmud, 2007). Consequently, 
intergroup attitudes would be associated with the particular relations between the groups 
and the resulting images they form of one another (Alexander, Brewer, & Hermann, 
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1999). Taken together, these theories imply that perceived relations between a third party 
and target outgroup would be a critical predictor of attitudes that one forms toward the 
target outgroup. Thus, while Pettigrew (2009) would propose that this influence is based 
on perceived similarity between the third party and target outgroup, this paper argues that 
it may be based on the perceived relationship – whether positive or negative – between 
the third party and target outgroup. Such a perspective would also be consistent with the 
basic tenets of balance theory, since attitude transference based strictly on similarity 
would result in an imbalanced state. In other words, perceived relations between a third 
party and a target outgroup could also influence the transference of attitudes from one 
group to the next. If applied to group contexts, balance theory would suggest that an ideal 
state requires balanced relations between groups (Heider, 1958). 
Extended Contact Processes 
In addition, the extended contact effect states that the mere knowledge that one’s 
ingroup member has established close relationships with outgroup members can lead one 
to develop more positive attitudes towards that outgroup (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-
Volpe, & Ropp, 1997); as such, ingroup members can guide and influence individuals’ 
intergroup attitudes and behaviors through vicarious experiences of friendship. In a study 
among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, knowledge that ingroup members 
had friends in the other group predicted more positive intergroup attitudes (Paolini, 
Hewstone, Cairns, & Voci, 2004). Proponents of the extended contact effect have also 
highlighted the significance of this process, particularly in situations where two groups 
have limited opportunities for direct contact (Eller, Abrams, & Gomez, 2012; Christ, 
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Hewstone, Tausch, Wagner, Voci, Hughes, & Cairns, 2010; Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & 
Vonofakou, 2008).  
I propose that balance theory functions primarily on the basis of these indirect 
processes to guide relations between multiple groups. In some multi-group contexts 
where intergroup hostility exists (such as the Middle East), groups may have minimal or 
no contact with each another (e.g., Lebanese and Israeli citizens). In these cases, it may 
be their experiences with third-party groups (other than the target outgroup) and extended 
contact with target groups that would influence their attitudes. The pattern of findings 
described above would replicate in regions where contact is not common, feasible, or 
sanctioned by authorities or one’s ingroup. 
Finally, greater attention is needed to explore both positive and negative processes 
involved in intergroup contact.  Research on contact has focused mainly on positive 
effects of direct and indirect contact on attitudes, but a disconnect remains between such 
contact research and what relations exist in real conflict settings (e.g., Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2003; Brown & Hewstone, 2005). In multigroup settings, not only do groups 
have to contend with the negative contact experiences, attitudes, or relations that occur 
with one group, but also with how these processes unfold in the presence of influential 
third party groups. In summary, when multiple groups exist, relational dynamics become 
more complex than what the current literature on intergroup relations presents. 
The “Third Party” Effect 
In summary, as balance theory might propose, attitudes and relations toward one 
target outgroup could depend – at least partially – on attitudes and relations toward a 
relevant third party group. Furthermore, just as positive attitudes may transfer from 
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experiences with one outgroup to another group, it is conceivable that negative attitudes 
could also transfer from experiences with a third party group to a target outgroup with 
whom contact may not have occurred. The quality of contact (positive or negative) that a 
primary group has with a third party would lead this primary group to establish 
correspondingly positive or negative attitudes toward the third party. Group members 
who observe or learn that this third party group has engaged in positive or negative 
interactions with a target outgroup may then modify their attitudes to correspond with the 
information they had just received about this contact. If the third party group is one with 
whom they have positive relations, then people’s attitudes towards the target outgroup are 
more likely to match those they have of the third party outgroup. If they have negative 
relations with the third party outgroup, however, then it is more likely that any contact 
that occurs between the third party and target outgroup would have the reverse effect on 
people’s attitudes. Following the algebraic equations of balance theory, the following 
third party effects are predicted; where “TPG” refers to third-party group, and “TO” 
refers to target outgroup: 
“I like TPG + I perceive a positive relation between TPG & TO  I like TO”  
(i.e., if “TO” are allies of my “TPG” allies, then “TO” are my allies) 
“I like TPG + I perceive a negative relation between TPG & TO   I dislike TO” 
 (i.e., if “TO” are enemies of my “TPG”allies, then “TO” are my enemies) 
 
“I dislike TPG + I perceive a positive relation between TPG & TO   I dislike TO” 
(i.e., if “TO” are allies of my “TPG” enemies, then “TO” are my enemies) 
“I dislike TPG + I perceive a negative relation between TPG & TO   I like TO” 
  (i.e., if “TO” are enemies of my “TPG” enemies, then “TO” are my allies) 
In other words, contact with a third party should affect one’s attitudes toward that 
third party, which should in turn affect attitudes toward a target outgroup; these effects 
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should depend on the perceived relation between the third party and target outgroup, and 
they should occur independent of any effects of direct contact between an individual and 
the target outgroup.  
The first study in this dissertation examines these issues in the context of 
Lebanese attitudes towards and relations with Israelis, as a function of their experiences 
with Palestinians. In this particular context, despite the minimal or complete lack of 
contact between Lebanese and Israelis, contact still occurs between Palestinians and 
Israelis. Therefore, Lebanese may base their attitudes or relations toward Israelis on the 
attitudes or relations they hold toward Palestinians and their knowledge about these 
Palestinians’ attitudes or relations with Israelis. The study presented here tests these 
relationships by assessing Lebanese contact, attitudes, and relations with Palestinians, 
and perceived attitudes or relations between Palestinians and Israelis, as predictors for 
Lebanese attitudes or relations toward Israelis. 
Research Goals and Hypotheses 
The majority of the research that has been conducted on intergroup relations has 
been based on processes that occur between two groups in conflict, and not enough 
attention has been dedicated to contexts that involve more than two groups. Moreover, 
the majority of studies on secondary transfer and extended contact effects has focused on 
positive intergroup processes, and has for the most part neglected the influence of 
negative processes. The application of balance theory in a multi-group context relies 
primarily on people’s perceptions of general relations between two groups to help them 
formulate or modify their attitudes towards one of these groups. These mechanisms are 
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explored in the studies presented in here, in an effort to distinguish between negative and 
positive intergroup effects. 
By applying balance theory to intergroup relations, this research examines how 
third-party influences occur through processes akin to secondary transfer effects, but with 
a few theoretical extensions. First, Pettigrew (2009) suggests that secondary transfer 
effects occur through mechanisms such as perceived similarities between the group with 
whom contact occurred and a separate target outgroup.  In the present research, I test 
whether other factors, such as perceived relations between these groups, are equally – or 
perhaps more – important for predicting attitudes toward the target outgroup. Alexander 
et al. (1999) have shown that participants who are given information about the relation 
between two groups subsequently generate images, such as enemy and ally, and attitudes 
consistent with the stereotypes of these group images.  In multi-group contexts, these 
consequent attitudes would shape the enemy versus ally relations that maintain structural 
balance between groups. 
This study also explores effects related to extended contact processes that occur 
when merely knowing of an ingroup member’s friendship with members of an outgroup 
can lead people to develop more positive attitudes toward that outgroup as a whole 
(Wright et al., 1997). While research on extended contact restricts itself to contexts that 
involve a shared identity between members of the same group, this project proposes that 
extended contact effects can take place through members of “third-party” groups as well. 
In addition, while extended contact research has typically focused on positive outcomes, 
such as improved intergroup attitudes (Wright et al., 1997), contact that occurs at the 
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negative end of the spectrum may similarly influence attitudes, albeit in an opposite, 
negative direction. 
In sum, the dissertation argues that our attitudes towards a target outgroup are 
affected by our relationship with a third party group and our perceptions of relations 
between that third party group and the target outgroup.  The studies described below aim 
to answer three main questions: First, when there is an established relationship between a 
third party and target outgroup, would one’s attitudes or relations toward the target 
outgroup depend on the perceived relationship between one’s group and the third party? 
Alternatively, would they depend on one’s perceptions of the third party’s attitudes and 
behaviors towards the target group? Finally, to what extent would one’s attitudes toward 
a target outgroup depend on the perceived relationship between the third party and target 
outgroup, or on the perceived similarity between the two?  
The extant literature on intergroup contact has not sufficiently explained the 
possible processes that occur when one group is faced with multiple other groups. Most 
of this work has also looked at positive contact and its effects, and more research is 
needed to understand negative contact effects and their potential for generalization (see 
Barlow, Paolini, Pederson, et al., 2012; Paolini et al., 2010). Direct and indirect contact 
effects could all potentially manifest themselves in negative and positive experiences and 
the formation of corresponding attitudes.  
Accordingly, in multi-group settings, individuals’ attitudes toward a target 
outgroup are likely to depend on how a third party group responds to that target outgroup, 
and on the relationship between one’s own group and the third party group. Participants 
would express more positive or negative attitudes towards a target group based on their 
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own relationship with this third party group, and based on the perceived relations 
between the third party and target outgroups. 
In summary, this research relies on balance theory as a tool to describe how the 
presence of one group may influence the attitudes and relations that develop between two 
other groups. These processes occur through indirect contact mechanisms, such that (see 
Figure 1): 
(1) If one group develops a positive attitude towards or relations with a third party group, 
then the valence of attitudes or relations it develops toward a target outgroup will be 
positively correlated with the valence of the perceived attitudes or relations between 
the third party and target groups. 
(2) If one group holds negative attitudes/relations toward a third party group, then the 
valence of subsequent attitudes/relations it develops toward a target outgroup will be 
negatively correlated with the valence of the perceived attitudes/relations between the 
third party and target outgroups. 
To examine these processes in multiple group relations, two studies are presented. 
The first study is a field survey in Lebanon that investigates these issues in terms of 
relationships between Lebanese, Palestinians, and Israelis. The goal of this survey study 
is to test how Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis (target outgroup) may be predicted 
through their attitudes and relations with Palestinians (third party). An experimental study 
with minimal groups then tested whether individuals’ attitudes towards a target outgroup 
would be affected by their experiences with a third-party group and that third-party 
group’s experiences with the target outgroup.  
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1: FIELD SURVEY OF THIRD PARTY EFFECTS: 
TESTING THE ROLES OF PALESTINIANS IN PREDICTING LEBANESE 
ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAELIS 
Study 1 focuses on Lebanese relations with Palestinians and Israelis, and how 
Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis vary in connection to their relationship with 
Palestinians. After 1948, many Palestinian refugees had to immigrate and seek shelter in 
various regions of the Arab world, including Lebanon. Unfortunately, not all Lebanese 
people welcomed them with open arms. For many Lebanese, Palestinians represented a 
threat to power and resources. For others, the Palestinian Resistance movement 
threatened to cause a revolutionary social and political change to the Arab society as a 
whole (Barakat, 1971). Importantly, Lebanon had also become an alternative 
battleground between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel (Mullany, 
1991). Such threats led to increased friction between Palestinian refugees and many 
Lebanese, and historians have often attributed the Lebanese 15-year civil war to this 
tension (Mullany, 1991).  At the same time, many Lebanese have been strong allies of 
Palestine and Palestinian groups in Lebanon, united in their antipathy toward Israel and 
Israelis in what is referred to as the “Arab-Israeli conflict” (Hudson, 1978).  Others may 
express sympathy towards the Palestinian cause, but do not necessarily hold positive 
attitudes towards Palestinians, and not all Lebanese feel negatively toward Israelis.  
Indeed, Lebanese attitudes towards Palestinians and Israelis vary greatly depending on 
their personal experiences and points of view. Some extreme views have called for the 
complete annihilation of the state of Israel and the expulsion of its citizens, while others 
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have held less harsh attitudes and expressed some willingness to establish dialogue with 
their Southern neighbors.  One goal of this research is to predict this variability in 
Lebanese attitudes towards Israelis, by examining them within the context of their 
attitudes towards Palestinians, and how such third-party effects serve to maintain a 
balanced state of group relations. 
The Lebanese context is a particularly useful – albeit challenging – one for 
examining these issues, because there are restricted opportunities for Lebanese people to 
engage in contact with Israelis that might impact their intergroup attitudes.  As mentioned 
previously, research has emphasized the importance of indirect contact effects, 
particularly when opportunities for direct contact between two groups are minimal 
(Turner et al., 2008; Wright et al., 1997). This situation clearly applies to the context of 
Lebanon, where contact between Lebanese and Israeli citizens is, in fact, illegal. Having 
no contact with Israelis, the attitudes that Lebanese individuals develop towards Israelis 
may then rely heavily on their experiences with Palestinians (with whom they have had 
more contact), and be informed by their perceptions of relations between Palestinians and 
Israelis. The same processes would also underlie how Lebanese visualize the structure of 
relations between the three groups, such that their perceptions of relations between 
Lebanese and Israelis in general may be informed by how they perceive Lebanese-
Palestinian relations as well as how they perceive Palestinian-Israeli relations. That said, 
it is also worth reminding the reader about the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which 
has created a great deal of hostility between the two groups. This research looks at 
whether Lebanese perceptions of the intensity of this hostility and animosity might then 
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influence their own attitudes toward Israelis and/or their own perceptions of Lebanese-
Israeli relations. 
In the current study, direct contact between Lebanese and Israelis could not be 
assessed, due to the sensitivity of that question in the Lebanese context.  Specifically, the 
researcher was cautioned not to include items assessing direct Lebanese-Israeli contact 
since this particular act is illegal and considered a form of state treason in Lebanon. As 
such, inclusion of such items would have likely aroused suspicion of the researcher’s 
intentions, which could, at the very least, reduce participants’ trust in and willingness to 
respond to the survey, and at a possible extreme, endanger the security of the researcher. 
Correspondingly, the predicted effects were tested without controlling for direct contact 
between Lebanese and Israelis, which tends to be minimal given the political context. 
 The survey in Study 1 focuses on Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis – in addition 
to how they see the nature of the relationship between Lebanese and Israelis in general – 
as a function of Lebanese perceptions of Palestinian attitudes and/or relations with 
Israelis, as well as Lebanese attitudes and/or relations with Palestinians.  Since previous 
research has found that Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis vary (Mullany, 1991; Barakat, 
1971), one goal of this research is to predict this variability by examining them within the 
context of their attitudes towards Palestinians, and how such third-party effects serve to 
maintain a balanced state of group relations. In the Lebanese context, opportunities for 
direct contact between Lebanese and Israelis are assumed (since they cannot be directly 
tested) to be minimal and Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis and general perceptions of 
Lebanese-Israeli relations may then rely heavily on the informative role that relations 
with Palestinians could play.  For example, if Lebanese have had positive contact 
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experiences with Palestinians, and know of Palestinians’ negative contact experiences 
with Israelis, this could lead Lebanese to develop negative attitudes toward Israelis. On 
the same note, if Lebanese have had negative experiences with Palestinians, and know of 
Palestinians’ negative contact experiences with Israelis, then Lebanese attitudes toward 
Israelis may be more positive than in the previous example.  
In summary, the hypotheses for this study are: 
(1) Lebanese participants’ attitudes toward Palestinians, combined with their perceptions 
of Palestinian-Israeli relations, will subsequently influence their attitudes toward 
Israelis. 
(2) Lebanese participants’ perceptions of Lebanese-Palestinian relations, combined with 
their perceptions of Palestinian-Israeli relations, will subsequently influence their 
perceptions of Lebanese-Israeli relations. 
(3) In predicting Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis and perceived Lebanese-Israeli 
relations, the effects of perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis will be 
observed beyond the role of perceived similarity. 
Participants and Sample 
A community sample of 400 Lebanese participants from across the country was 
recruited over a four-month period (August – November 2011) through their affiliations 
with several non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) that agreed to assist with the data 
collection process. Items assessed Lebanese direct contact experiences and resulting 
attitudes toward Palestinians, as well as the perceived relations and perceived similarities 
between Palestinians and Israelis. Additional variables of primary interest included 
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Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis and their perceptions of relations between Lebanese 
and Israelis. 
Demographic Characteristics of Community Sample 
As part of this survey, respondents answered a number of demographic indicators, 
including age, gender, religion, political orientation and political party support. Around 
5% of respondents did not provide their age, and 3.7% did not provide their gender. 
Larger proportions of respondents offered no response to questions about religion (15%), 
political orientation (33.8%), and political party support (33.3%). Given the political 
instability and sectarian strife in the region, these results were somewhat expected. 
Earlier that year (January 2011), the Lebanese government had collapsed and some party 
leaders were talking about changing alliances. A Hezbollah-dominated cabinet was 
finally formed in June of that year. These events, combined with the wars and political 
and religious tension over the years, has led cynicism and apprehension about political 
and religious allegiances. 
Of those who did respond to the demographic items, the mean age was 25.5 years 
(SD=6.63), ranging from 16 to 63 years old. As for gender, 208 responded as male (52%) 
and 177 responded as female (44.3%). The majority of respondents were Muslim (65%), 
with Muslim Shiites making up 44.8% of the total sample (N=179). Christians made up 
18% of the sample (N=72), with the rest belonging to minority groups or undeclared. 
This religious make-up is to some extent representative of the current religious 
distribution in Lebanon, although an official national census has not been conducted 
since 1932 (Maktabi, 1999), due to the political sensitivity of the matter (U.S. 
Department of State, 2001). Although not necessarily accurate, more recent estimates for 
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Christians in Lebanon range from 39% to 41.5% of the population, while Muslims are 
thought to make up around 60% of the population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014; 
U.S. Department of State, 2013). 
Half of the respondents (N=200, 50%) generally regarded themselves as 
proponents of the March 8 political block, while 65 respondents (16.3%) regarded 
themselves as proponents of the March 14 political block, and the rest (33.7%) either 
declared themselves as “other” or “undecided” or did not provide a response. This was 
again not unexpected, with the current make-up of the government and the turmoil that 
the March 14 block was going through. Finally, in terms of political parties, the two most 
supported parties were Hezbollah (N=58, 14.5%), which belonged to the March 8 
movement, and the Future Movement (N=46, 11.5%), which belonged to the March 14 
movement. 
In addition, information about respondents’ education level and income level 
were gathered. In terms of education, 383 respondents provided a response, and the 
majority (N=229; 59.8%) reported reaching a college or university education, while only 
12 respondents (3.1%) reported achieving basic education, 66 respondents (17.2%) 
acquired a secondary education (the equivalent of high school level), 32 respondents 
(8.4%) received technical school education, and 44 (11.5%) had reached a graduate level 
of education. These demographics parallel what surveys from other sources, such as the 
World Bank database, which has found that around 51.6 % of Lebanese enroll in higher 
education (The World Bank, 2009). As for income, only 357 people provided responses 
to this question, the majority of whom (N = 109; 30.5%) reported an average monthly 
income ranging between $1,001 – 1,500. 42 respondents (11.8%) reported earning less 
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than $500 a month, and 88 respondents (24.6%) reported earning between $501 – 1,000 
every month. Only 23 respondents (6.4%) reported earning between $1,501 – 2,500 a 
month, and only 21 respondents (5.9%) reported earning more than $3,500 per month.  
Measures 
The survey included measures adapted from pre-existing literature on intergroup 
contact, as well as measures based on interview data conducted prior to the study, to help 
inform the research and create a culturally sensitive survey (see Appendix A for primary 
survey measures). Responses to survey items listed below are scored on 7-point Likert 
scales as indicated below. 
Primary Measures to Test Third-Party Effects 
The goal of this study is to assess whether Lebanese attitudes toward a third party 
(i.e., Palestinians) can predict Lebanese attitudes toward a target outgroup (i.e., Israelis), 
through the perceived relations between the third party and the target outgroup (i.e., 
between Palestinians and Israelis).  Therefore, key measures in the survey assess 1) 
Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians, 2) Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, and 3) 
perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis.  
Lebanese Attitudes toward Palestinians 
A general evaluation scale asked Lebanese participants to describe how they felt 
towards Palestinians (based on Wright et al., 1997). On a scale from “1” to “7”, 
participants were asked to indicate, how negative/positive, cold/warm, hostile/friendly, 
and suspicious/trusting they felt towards Palestinians. Responses to the four items were 
averaged into one attitudes measure (α = .92). 
 21 
Perceived Relations between Lebanese and Palestinians 
To measure respondents’ perceptions of Lebanese-Palestinian relations in general, 
participants were asked to report the extent to which they perceived relations between 
Lebanese and Palestinians to be cooperative-competitive or allies-enemies (α = .92) on a 
7-point scale.  
Perceived Attitudes and Relations between Palestinians and Israelis 
To test the proposed moderating influence of perceived attitudes and relations in 
the present research, participants were presented with two measures. First, to assess their 
perceptions of Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis, they were asked to rate to what extent 
they perceived Palestinians to feel friendly-hostile, warm-cold, hostile/friendly, and 
suspicious/trusting toward Israelis (α = .98). To measure their perceptions of Palestinian-
Israeli relations in general, participants were asked to state the extent to which they 
perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis to be cooperative-competitive or 
allies-enemies (α = .92) on a 7-point scale.  
Lebanese Attitudes toward Israelis 
The same general evaluation scale used above measured how Lebanese 
participants felt toward Israelis as the outcome variable. Responses to these four items 
were also averaged into one attitudes measure (α = .99). 
Perceived Relations between Lebanese and Israelis 
In addition, using comparable items described previously for perceived relations 
between Palestinians and Israelis, respondents were asked to report on their perceptions 
of the relations between Lebanese and Palestinians (α = .92) and between Lebanese and 
Israelis (α = .92). 
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Secondary Measures to Test Third Party Effects 
In addition, several other measures were included to examine related processes 
and mechanisms. 
Lebanese Contact with Palestinians 
Given that direct contact experience predicts intergroup attitudes (e.g., Pettigrew 
& Tropp, 2006), direct contact between Lebanese and Palestinians were measured in 
several ways.  Lebanese participants indicated how often they have had contact with 
members of each group, as well as the number of acquaintances and friends they had 
from each group. 
Other items measured the extent to which Lebanese participants’ contact 
experiences with Palestinians were generally positive or negative (e.g., How often have 
you had had positive/negative contact experiences with Palestinians?”; modified from 
Barlow et al., 2012). Additional items assessing contact quality asked participants to 
indicate their levels of agreement to statements such as “When I interact with 
Palestinians, the contact is almost always pleasant/hostile” (modified from Islam & 
Hewstone, 1993). Responses to 15 contact items were averaged into one aggregate 
measure, and the reliability coefficient for these item scales was high (α = .82). 
Perceived Similarity 
Perceptions of similarity between Lebanese and Palestinians (α = .91), between 
Lebanese and Israelis (α = .96), and between Palestinians and Israelis (α = .94) were also 
assessed. In three separate items, participants were asked the extent to which they 
perceived each pair of groups to be similar in political ideology, cultural ideology, and 
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goals and interests. The scale ranged from “1”, being “very different” , to “7”, being 
“very similar”. 
Extended Contact 
Also relevant to the goals of the present research, “third-party” extended contact 
was assessed through four items asking participants to report their knowledge of 
members of the third-party group (Palestinians) who have had positive and negative 
contact with members of the target outgroup (e.g., “How many Palestinians do you know 
who have had positive/negative contact experiences with Israelis?”).  The survey also 
included items that asked about perceived quality of Palestinians’ contact experiences 
with Israelis (e.g., “When the Palestinians you know interact with Israelis, the contact is 
almost always pleasant/hostile”), with item responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree). Responses on 14 items were averaged into one aggregate measure, 
with high reliability (α = .80). 
Results 
To test the hypotheses through the measures described above, regression analyses 
were used to predict Lebanese participants’ attitudes toward and relations with Israelis. In 
testing for third party effects, Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis (“Lebanese Attitudes 
toward Israelis” measure) will be predicted by 1) Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians, 
and 2) Lebanese perceptions of attitudes and relations between Palestinians and Israelis.  
The interaction between these predictor variables was tested to explain Lebanese attitudes 
toward Israelis. In addition, secondary analyses examined the role of perceived 
similarities between Palestinians and Israelis (“secondary transfer” mechanism) and 
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Lebanese knowledge of Palestinians’ contact experiences with Israelis “extended 
contact” mechanism), as other possible predictors of Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis. 
Mean scores and standard deviations of the study measures are shown in Table 1. 
Not surprisingly, Lebanese report more positive attitudes toward Palestinians than toward 
Israelis, t(358) = 26.2, p<.001. Similarly, Lebanese report more positive Lebanese-
Palestinian relations than Lebanese-Israeli relations, t(374) = 23.0, SE=.13, p<.001. 
Interestingly, though, although participants reported very negative Palestinian-Israeli 
relations, on average they reported that these were less negative than Lebanese-Israeli 
relations, t(383) = 4.1, SE=.04, p<.001. This is an interesting observation on Lebanese 
participants’ perceptions that there is stronger enmity between Lebanese and Israelis than 
between Palestinians and Israelis. In addition, the mean scores for perceived similarity 
were in the expected directions. First, participants found that Lebanese were more similar 
to Palestinians than to Israelis, t(376) = 27.36, SE=.11, p<.001. Participants also found 
that while both Palestinians and Lebanese have very little in common with Israelis, 
Palestinians might be a little more similar to Israelis than Lebanese are, t(376)=3.80, 
SE=.04, p<.001. This could make sense since most Palestinians and Israelis live in close 
proximity and have inhabited the same land for centuries (under different group names). 
Table 2 shows correlations between all measures, with noteworthy observations. 
First, as expected positive contact experience with Palestinians is related to positive 
attitudes toward Palestinians, r=.45, p<.001. It was also related to more positive 
perceptions of Lebanese-Palestinian relations, r=.19, p<.001, as well as more negative 
perceptions of Palestinian-Israeli relations, r= -.16, p<.001 and of Lebanese-Israeli 
relations, r= -.16, p<.001. A more interesting finding is that more positive attitudes 
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toward Palestinians were correlated with more positive attitudes toward Israelis, r=.29, 
p<.001. 
On the other hand, there is a significant positive relationship between perceived 
Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis and Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, r=.92, p<.001, 
such that the more respondents perceived that Palestinians felt positively toward Israelis, 
the more they themselves felt positively toward Israelis. The data also revealed that 
attitudes toward Israelis are negatively correlated with perceived Lebanese-Palestinian 
relations, r= -.55, p<.001, as well as perceived Lebanese-Palestinian similarities, r= 33, 
p<.001 and Palestinian-Israeli similarities, r=74, p<.001.Moreover, the more respondents 
felt that any of the pairs of groups were similar, the more positively they felt toward 
Israelis. Finally, it is worth noting that perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations are negatively 
correlated with perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations, r= -.19, p<.001, but positively 
correlated with perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations, r=.87, p<.001. Therefore, when 
respondents felt that Lebanese and Palestinians were cooperative allies, or the more they 
perceived that Palestinians and Israelis were competitive enemies, they more they felt 
that Lebanese and Israelis were competitive enemies as well.  
Of the 400 respondents, only 234 indicated that they have had any form of contact 
with Palestinians, but four of these did not provide responses on the contact measures. 
Thus, for analyses involving that measure, responses from 230 participants were 
analyzed. The mean score for quality of contact and for attitudes toward Palestinians 
were both above average (M = 5.18, SD = .94 and M = 5.35, SD = 1.2, respectively). A 
linear regression analysis reveals that the contact of quality that Lebanese respondents 
have with Palestinians directly and positively influence their attitudes toward them. Thus, 
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greater positive contact experiences with Palestinians more positive attitudes toward 
Palestinians, among Lebanese participants, b = .55, SE = .08, p <.001. 
Before proceeding with the analysis below, however, it is important to explain 
some necessary transformations that were performed due to the uniqueness of these data. 
With a politically charged questionnaire that involved relations and attitudes toward 
Israelis, participants’ responses were expectedly extreme and highly skewed. For 
example, the mean for participant attitudes toward Israelis is 1.96 on a 7-point scale, with 
a median of 1.00, i.e. the lowest score on the scale, where 71.8% of participants reported 
the most negative attitudes toward Israelis. This leaves 28.2% of the values spread across 
all other values for that construct (see Figure 2 for a sample distribution of Lebanese 
attitudes toward Israelis, compared to Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis). This positive 
skewness was found among most variables that refer to relations with Israelis, including 
perceptions of Palestinian contact with as well as attitudes toward Israelis, Lebanese and 
Palestinian relations with Israelis, and Lebanese and Palestinian relations with 
Israelis1.As such, it was suspected that the assumptions were violated due to the extreme 
non-normality in the data, so these variables were split and a binary logistic regression, 
which does not have the assumption of normally distributed residuals, was conducted. In 
this context and in the case of politically charged responses, the loss of information 
occurring as a result of splitting responses into dichotomous variables is both minimal 
and considerably irrelevant to the research question being addressed (for more 
information, see Farrington & Loeber, 2000). 
With this information, these measures should not be treated as pure continuous 
variables. Therefore, the variables were split into two groups, based on whether they were 
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extreme or not. This approach allows us to distinguish between (1) those who hold 
strictly negative attitudes toward Israelis, and (2) those who sway at all from that score. 
This distinction reflects the nature of the Lebanese political climate, where citizens are 
expected to dislike Israelis, and thus those who do not strictly adhere to that norm would 
belong to a category of their own. In this analysis, the question becomes dichotomous, 
such that it focuses on whether a respondent is someone different from the majority or 
not. Splitting the variable here may be the appropriate approach given the skewed 
distribution of data and the question rased above. When asked in this manner, running a 
regression analysis could not inform us about whether respondents deviated from the 
norm, but a logistic regression does exactly that. 
Logistic regression (LR) is a multivariable method of analysis that is commonly 
used for modeling dichotomous outcomes in social science research, specifically to 
overcome limitations or ordinary least squares regression analyses (Bagley, White, & 
Golomb, 2001; Peng & So, 2002). Therefore, logistic regression will be used to study the 
relation between the transformed categorical outcome variables of the Lebanese dataset, 
where the model would predict the logit of the outcome variable from the predictor 
variable 
This first section examines a test of the hypotheses predicting Lebanese attitudes 
toward Israelis through their attitudes toward Palestinians as well as either (1) their 
perceptions about Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis or (2) their perceptions about 
Palestinian-Israeli relations. The section that follows includes another relevant analysis, 
showing how perceived relations between Lebanese and Israelis could be predicted by the 
perceived relations between Lebanese and Palestinians and between Palestinians and 
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Israelis. This latter test sheds an additional light on how third parties shape structural 
balance in the way individuals perceive relations between multiple groups. Finally, the 
influence of perceived Palestinian-Israeli attitudes and Palestinian-Israeli relations are 
each examined while controlling for the potential influence of Palestinian-Israeli 
similarities. 
Predicting Lebanese Attitudes toward Israelis 
For the following analyses that involve constructs that have been transformed to 
dichotomous variables, binary logistic regressions were conducted, first testing the 
interaction of Attitudes toward Palestinians X Perceptions of Palestinian Attitudes 
toward Israelis in predicting Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis. The model was fit to the 
data to explain the predicted odds of positive Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, while 
including two main effects – Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians and perceived 
Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis – and their interaction. Entering both predictors and 
their interaction term into the analysis reveals a significant omnibus test of the overall 
model, X2 = 128.56, p<.001, and this indicates that the model is a good fit to the data. In 
addition, the estimated variance explained by the model is around 43%, Nagelkerke 
R2=.433. The classification table for Block 1 indicates that the model correctly classifies 
81.4% of the cases, which is an improvement over a model that does not include the 
predictors (Block 0). Based on these indicators, we turn to look at the regression slopes.  
First, controlling for other variables in the model, perceived Palestinian attitudes 
toward Israelis significantly predict Lebanese respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis, 
b=3.95, SE=1.41, Wald=7.87, Exp(B)=.019, p<.001. Therefore, as perceived Palestinian 
attitudes toward Israelis change from negative to more positive, Lebanese attitudes 
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toward Israelis also become more positive. On the other hand, Lebanese attitudes toward 
Palestinians also predict their attitudes toward Israelis, but not in the expected direction, 
b=.35, SE=.12, Wald=9.33, Exp(B)=1.43, p=.002; more positive attitudes toward 
Palestinians predicted more positive attitudes toward Israelis. There was no significant 
interaction effect on attitudes toward Israelis, however, b=.18, SE=.25, Wald=.51, 
Exp(B)=1.20, p=.476 (when examined separately in a model though, the interaction term 
significantly predicted attitudes toward Israelis, b=.48, SE=.06, Wald=61.69, Exp(B)=.62, 
p<.001), indicating that perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis is a considerably 
stronger predictor of Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis). The graph depicting this 
interaction is presented below (Figure 3; see Table 3 for results). 
Predicting Perceived Relations between Lebanese and Israelis 
Second, a binary logistic regression tested the interaction of Perceived Lebanese-
Palestinian Relations X Perceived Palestinian-Israeli Relations in the prediction of 
Perceived Lebanese-Israeli Relations. Entering both predictors and their interaction term 
into the analysis reveals a significant omnibus test of the overall model, X2 = 93.29, 
p<.001, indicating a good fit of the model to the data. In addition, the estimated variance 
explained by the model is around 33%, Nagelkerke R2=.329. The classification table for 
Block 1 indicates that the model correctly classifies 79.5% of the cases, which is an 
improvement over a model that does not include the predictors (Block 0) and correctly 
classifies 76% of the cases.  
Controlling for other variables, perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations significantly 
predict perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=3.49, SE=.84, Wald=17.17, Exp(B)=.03, 
p<.001. Therefore, as perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations change from allies to 
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enemies, perceptions of Lebanese-Israeli relations become more positive (more allied). 
Furthermore, perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations also predict Lebanese-Israeli 
relations, b=-.33, SE=.13, Wald=6.76, Exp(B)=.72, p=.009. In other words, higher 
perceptions of allied relations between Lebanese and Palestinians predict higher 
perceptions of enemy relations between Lebanese and Israelis. However, there was no 
significant interaction effect on perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=.25, SE=.18, 
Wald=2.02, Exp(B)=1.29, p=.16 (but when examined alone, without controlling for the 
main variables, the interaction significantly predicted attitudes toward Israelis, b=.48, 
SE=.06, Wald=61.69, Exp(B)=.62, p<.001). The graph depicting this interaction is 
presented below (Figure 4; see Table 4 for summary of outcome statistics). 
Adding Perceived Similarity as a Predictor 
Next, the influence of intergroup similarity was examined alongside the two 
predictors, perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis and perceived Palestinian-
Israeli relations. First, Palestinian-Israeli similarities was included in the same model 
with perceived Palestinian attitudes, X2 = 129.80, p<.001, Nagelkerke R2=.398. The 
model correctly classifies 79.3% of the cases (an improvement over a model that does not 
include the predictors, 71.8%). Controlling for perceived similarity, perceived Palestinian 
attitudes toward Israelis significantly predict perceived respondents’ attitudes toward 
Israelis, b=2.60, SE=.31, Wald=70.50, Exp(B)=.07, p<.001. Perceived Palestinian-Israeli 
similarities, on the other hand, do not predict respondents’ attitudes, b=-.46, SE=.30, 
Wald=2.43, Exp(B)=.63, p=.119, when controlling for Palestinian attitudes toward 
Israelis. Therefore, it is perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis – not perceived 
Palestinian-Israeli similarities – that predict perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations. 
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Finally, Palestinian-Israeli similarities was included in the same model with 
perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations, X2 = 111.75, p<.001, Nagelkerke R2=.356. The 
model correctly classifies 76.5% of the cases (an improvement over a model that does not 
include the predictors, 73.8%). Controlling for perceived similarity, perceived 
Palestinian-Israeli relations significantly predict perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, 
b=2.59, SE=.30, Wald=75.93, Exp(B)=.08, p<.001. Perceived Palestinian-Israeli 
similarities also predict Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=-.61, SE=.27, Wald=5.28, 
Exp(B)=.54, p=.022. Therefore, perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations predict perceived 
Lebanese-Israeli relations, above and beyond (and more strongly than) the influence of 
perceived similarity. 
Discussion 
This research tests how attitudes and perceptions that members of one group form 
about a target outgroup depend on their relationship with third-party groups, and the 
perceived relations that third-party groups have with the target outgroup. To test this in a 
field context, a survey study was conducted with a sample of Lebanese participants, who 
were asked to report their attitudes and experiences with Palestinians as well as their 
perceptions about Lebanese-Palestinian-Israeli relations, and their own attitudes toward 
Israelis. As expected, Lebanese respondents felt more positively toward Palestinians and 
very negatively toward Israelis. They also perceived relations between Palestinians and 
Israelis, as well as relations between Lebanese and Israelis, to be extremely negative. 
Attitudes toward Israelis 
A primary focus of this paper was to examine whether a third-party group – in 
this case, Palestinians – would predict the attitudes that respondents held toward the 
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target outgroup – Israelis – and the relationship they perceived Lebanese and Israelis to 
have. Specifically, the paper predicted an interaction between one’s attitudes toward 
Palestinians and perceptions of Palestinian-Israeli attitudes to influence respondents’ 
attitudes. The data, however, only partially supported the hypotheses. To begin with, 
when comparing the first two potential predictors (attitudes toward Palestinians and 
perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis), data from this study indicated that the 
attitudes that respondents held toward Israelis were only influenced by how they thought 
Palestinians felt toward Israelis. In other words, Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis were 
more positive if they thought that Palestinians felt more positively toward Israelis as well. 
This statement (and others) could be framed a different way as well, such that when 
respondents thought Palestinians felt more negatively toward Israelis, they also felt more 
negatively toward Israelis. However, the way respondents felt toward Palestinians in 
general did not significantly influence the way they felt toward Israelis. This only varied 
if respondents felt that Palestinians did not feel extremely negatively toward Israelis. In 
other words, when Palestinians were thought to hold very hostile attitudes toward Israelis, 
then Lebanese respondents felt negatively toward Israelis as well, regardless of how they 
felt toward Palestinians. However, when Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis were seen as 
less hostile, then the way Lebanese felt toward Palestinians made a difference. In this 
case, when Palestinians were thought to feel even slightly more positively toward Israelis, 
then the more respondents liked Palestinians, the more positively they also felt toward 
Israelis. Hence, the processes underlying structural balance occurred only when 
Palestinians were not perceived to hold very negative attitudes toward Israelis. One 
possible reason could be the presence of strong Lebanese norms to hold negative attitudes 
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toward Israelis. Perhaps only when Palestinians (presumably the main enemies of 
Israelis) are perceived as less hostile toward Israelis, and Lebanese feel positively and 
close to Palestinians, do Lebanese feel justified to feel less hostile toward Israelis as well. 
Although this is not explored in this dissertation, future work will examine the role of 
norm strength – and other variables – in predicting attitude change within a structural 
balance model of third party influence. Nevertheless, these preliminary findings offer 
partial support for the main proposition of this paper, highlighting the role of third parties 
in the formation of attitudes toward target outgroups.  
Perceived Lebanese-Israeli Relations 
In addition to looking at how attitudes are formed as a function of third-party 
influence, the study looked at whether perceived relations between the three groups 
followed the conceptual model of structural balance as well. Therefore, I examined the 
influence of perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations and Palestinian-Israeli relations on 
how respondents perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations. Once again, the findings strongly 
supported the existence of third-party influence. First, when examined separately, 
perceptions of more cooperative and allied relations between Lebanese and Palestinians 
predicted perceptions of more competitive and enemy relations between Lebanese and 
Israelis. However, when examined alongside the second predictor, results showed that 
perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis played a stronger role in predicting 
perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, and in fact, how respondents thought about 
Lebanese-Palestinian relations ceased to influence perceived-Israeli relations.  
In summary, among Lebanese participants, how respondents felt toward Israelis 
varied as a function of how they perceived Palestinians attitudes toward Israelis and not 
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as a function of how they felt toward Palestinians. Similarly, how Lebanese respondents 
perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations varied as a function of how they perceived 
Palestinian-Israeli relations, more than how they perceived Lebanese-Palestinian 
relations. 
The Role of Perceived Palestinian-Israeli Similarities 
One mechanism that was suggested to take place is that of secondary transfer 
effect. The goal of this dissertation is to challenge one notion of secondary transfer, that 
the extent of intergroup similarity was what drove people to “transfer” their attitudes 
from one group to another. In this context, I found that similarities between Palestinians 
and Israelis predicted more positive attitudes toward Israelis; however, a stronger 
predictor of these attitudes was, in fact, perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis. In 
other words, although intergroup similarity is related to attitudes toward the target 
outgroup, perceived third-party attitudes toward the target group influenced these 
attitudes more strongly and above and beyond the role of intergroup similarities. 
Moreover, I also found that perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis was the 
main driving factor in how respondents perceived relations between Lebanese and 
Israelis, above and beyond the role of perceived Palestinian-Israeli similarities. 
The Role of Extended Palestinian Contact with Israelis 
Another suggested mechanism was that of the extended contact effect, where, in 
this case, the way respondents saw Palestinian contact experiences with Israelis would 
influence their own attitudes toward Israelis. However, Palestinian contact with Israelis 
did not predict attitudes toward Israelis, unless it was examined within the same model as 
Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis (see Appendix C for a discussion of the results). 
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Furthermore, in that model, Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis were more negative as 
Palestinian contact with Israelis was more positive. A similar pattern was also found 
when the role of Palestinian-Israeli contact in predicting perceived Lebanese-Israeli 
relations was examined. Further examination of the data will aim to uncover potentially 
mediating or moderating factors, such as changes in Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, 
which could affect this relationship.  
Conclusion 
 In summary, the preliminary findings from this study partially support the 
proposed hypotheses, and demonstrate how the presence of a third party – in this case, 
Palestinians – may influence the attitudes that respondents may have toward Israelis, as 
well as the relations they perceive other Lebanese may have with Israelis. In this 
particular context, it was the perception of the attitudes that Palestinians held toward 
Israelis, and of the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis, that subsequently 
predicted how respondents felt toward Israelis and how they saw the relationship between 
their own group and Israelis. This was further shown to be true above and beyond any 
similarities that might have been perceived between Palestinians and Israelis. 
 The findings from this study provide promising support to the influence of 
third parties in the formation of attitudes and relations toward a target outgroup. 
However, as a preliminary examination of third party effects, the study also came with a 
number of limitations. First, due to the sensitivity of items asking about direct contact 
between Lebanese and Israelis, this study was unable to measure the influence of indirect 
third party effects, above and beyond those of direct contact. Furthermore, the context in 
which the data was collected contains very powerful norms when it comes to political 
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attitudes, particularly toward Israelis. Therefore, the majority of respondents (between 
50% and 70%) felt strongly negatively toward Israelis and the relationship between 
Israelis and both Lebanese and Palestinians, and this made it difficult to assess responses 
from across a wide spectrum of attitudes and opinions. Nevertheless, the data provided by 
respondents who deviated from these norms and the overall results from this preliminary 
study are encouraging. Future survey studies in other contexts should include assessments 
of direct contact between the primary group and target outgroup, and where there are no 
psychological, social, or legal pressures involved. 
Furthermore, with this correlational field survey, it is difficult to determine the 
direction of these influences or the causal role of any of the variables. Regression 
analyses have shown, in a real world context, that attitudes and relations with a target 
outgroup (Israelis) can vary as a function of attitudes and relations with a third party 
(Palestinians) and perceived attitudes and relations between that third party and target 
outgroup. However, it is possible that one’s relations with Palestinians would be a 
product of their relations with Israelis, instead. One method that could offer clearer 
conclusion about causality is through a laboratory experiment, which can control for 
other potentially influencing factors as well as for the sequence of events and information 
obtained by participants. Thus, an experimental study was conducted to simulate a 
multigroup context by including three groups. In this study the primary group of 
participants interacts with and forms attitudes about a “third party” group before being 
introduced to a target outgroup. This experimental study allows for tests of the causal role 
of third party effects in a multigroup context. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2: 
EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THIRD PARTY EFFECTS 
Study 2 seeks to replicate and extend the research presented in Study 1, using 
experimental procedures that parallel multi-groups settings through the use of laboratory-
generated groups. The creation of minimal groups in the laboratory has consistently 
demonstrated its effectiveness in producing intergroup boundaries and feelings of 
belonging that correspond to differences in attitudes toward one’s own group and other 
groups (Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears, 1995; Giessner & Mummundey, 2008; Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).  Specifically, this experiment tests how a group 
member’s contact experiences with a third-party group, and information regarding 
relations between a third party and target outgroup, positively or negatively influence 
their attitudes toward the target outgroup. Two factors were manipulated: (1) whether 
participants experience positive or negative contact with a third-party group; and (2) 
whether participants learn that relations between the third-party group and target 
outgroup are friendly or hostile.  Growing from this design, the study tested two broad 
hypotheses: 
1) There would be a main effect of valence of participants’ contact with the third-party 
group: positive contact with a third-party group would lead to positive attitudes 
towards that group, whereas negative contact with a third-party group would lead to 
negative attitudes toward that group.  
2) The valence of participants’ contact with the third-party group would interact with the 
perceived relations between the third-party group and target outgroup, such that: 
 38 
a) If participants develop positive attitudes toward a third-party group through 
positive contact, and learn of positive relations between the third party group 
and target outgroup, participants would anticipate positive relations with the 
target outgroup. 
b) If participants develop positive attitudes toward a third-party group through 
positive contact, and learn of negative relations the third party group and 
target outgroup, participants would anticipate negative relations with the 
target outgroup. 
c) If participants develop negative attitudes toward a third-party group through 
negative contact, and learn of positive relations the third party group and 
target outgroup, participants would anticipate negative relations with the 
target outgroup. 
d) If participants develop negative attitudes toward a third-party group through 
negative contact, and then learn of negative relations between the third party 
group and target outgroup, participants would anticipate positive relations 
with the target outgroup. 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 201 undergraduate students who were registered in psychology courses 
at the University of Massachusetts, and who were eligible to earn experimental credit for 
their participation, were recruited for this study.  Another criterion for their recruitment 
was that they had participated in a prescreening study prior to this one. Although their 
specific responses to the prescreening were not used this study, participants were 
informed of group membership based on responses to measures assessed during the 
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prescreening. Each session required the participation of three undergraduate students who 
signed up for the experiment in exchange for course credit.  Participants were asked to 
come into the lab for two half-hour studies that ostensibly take place within one 60-
minute testing session. The actual purpose of the testing session was to manipulate the 
valence of contact (positive, negative, or “no information” control) between the 
participant’s group and a “third party” group of confederates. When students showed up 
for the study, they were told that their responses to a prescreening survey had placed 
them into one of three groups on the basis of cognitive processing style: “deduction”, 
“induction”, or “abduction”. The first two group labels, “Inductive” versus “Deductive” 
thinkers, have been used by Doosje et al. (1995) to create minimal laboratory groups. The 
third group, “Abductive,” comes from research on computational semiotics that 
differentiates between three different kinds of knowledge units or operators: knowledge 
extraction (deduction), knowledge generation (induction), and knowledge selection 
(abduction; see Gudwin, 2002). In this particular study, participants were told that they 
belonged to the “Deductive” processing group. 
They were then given a chance to establish an ingroup identity that stems from 
their shared processing style, using an abridged version of Wright et al.’s (1997) 
experimental procedures.  Participants were first assigned a same-colored T-shirt to wear 
during the study and then asked to introduce themselves to other members of their group 
and spend around four minutes “breaking the ice” by discussing interests that they all 
have in common and figuring out what characteristics they, as “Deductive” participants, 
might share.  
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Participants were taken to a room with one computer and informed that they 
would interact “virtually” as a group with the “Inductive” group of students (i.e., third-
party group), who were ostensibly sitting in a similar computer room; they would work 
with the “Inductive” group on some assigned tasks for approximately 15 minutes.  Virtual 
contact has been used in previous research to emulate direct contact and has often been 
found to have similar effects as those observed in direct contact settings (e.g., Hewstone, 
Cairns, Voci, Paolini, McLernon, Crisp, Niens, & Craig, 2005; Williams, Cheung, & 
Choi, 2000). Following these procedures, participants were given a survey about their 
attitudes towards their own group and their expectations for contact with the third party 
group, as well as their attitudes toward that group. 
To facilitate their work together as a “Deductive” group, participants were 
gathered around one computer and shared their tasks. Virtual responses from the 
“Inductive” third-party group consisted of one of three different sets of scripts prepared 
and programmed in advance, and randomly selected for each testing session.  In the 
positive contact condition, the third-party group ostensibly communicated pleasant and 
friendly statements, such as “we’re really enjoying working on this task with you.”  In the 
negative contact condition, the third party group ostensibly communicated unpleasant and 
hostile statements, such as “working with you has not been fun at all.”  In a separate 
control condition, the third party remained neutral throughout the interaction. Following 
the virtual interaction, participants were seated separately and given a survey to assess 
their attitudes toward the “Inductive” third-party group, along with their attitudes about 
the task and manipulation checks (see Appendix B for primary measures used in the 
study).  
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Participants were then informed that they would next interact with a new group 
(“Abductive” thinkers, or the “target outgroup”), with whom the “Inductive” (third-party) 
group had already interacted.  This procedure was used to manipulate participants’ 
perceptions of relations between the third-party group and the target outgroup.  The 
researcher then informed one-third of the participants that the third-party group 
(“Inductive thinkers”) and the target outgroup (“Abductive thinkers”) got along very well 
(positive relations condition), while the other third were told that the two groups did not 
get along well at all (negative relations condition). The final third of participants received 
no information about the quality of the relations between “Inductive” and “Abductive” 
thinkers (control condition).  
Following these procedures, participants were asked to complete additional 
survey questions to check the effects of the manipulation and assess initial attitudes 
toward and anticipated feelings about interacting with the target outgroup (Abductive 
thinkers; see below for description of measures). Once they completed the surveys, 
participants were fully debriefed of the true purpose of the study, given the opportunity to 
discuss the goals of the study, had any of their questions answered, and finally were 
thanked for their time. 
Measures 
The primary goal of this experiment is to examine whether participants’ attitudes 
toward third party groups – resulting from positive or negative contact experiences – and 
perceived relations between the third party and target outgroups would impact their 
subsequent attitudes toward the target outgroup. The survey relied on similar items as to 
those included in the field survey described above, but their frames of reference changed 
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to the groups involved in the lab experiment. The variables measured in the experiment 
are as follows: 
Manipulation Checks 
Contact and Attitudes toward the Third-Party “Inductive” Group. 
To check the effectiveness of the first manipulation, participants were asked to 
report their attitudes towards the third party group, with whom they had a virtual 
interaction. Items measured the extent to which their contact experience with that group 
was positive or negative, and whether the interaction was pleasant or hostile. Twelve 
items measuring quality of contact were scored on a 7-point scale, ranging from “1” 
(strongly disagree) to “7” strongly agree, where 6 of these items were reverse-coded (α = 
.96). The next items assessed participants’ attitudes toward the third party “Inductive” 
group, paralleling items used in Study 1. A general evaluation scale asked participants to 
describe how negative/positive, cold/warm, hostile/friendly, and suspicious/trusting they 
felt toward the “Inductive group”, on a scale from “1” to “7” (adapted from Wright et al., 
1997; α=.94). 
Perceived Relationship and Interaction between the Third Party “Inductive” and 
Target Outgroup “Abductive” 
Twelve survey items asked about the perceived interaction (e.g., friendly-hostile, 
positive-negative, etc.) between the “Inductive” and “Abductive” groups (α=.946). Scores 
were based on a 7-point scale. In addition, two items examined the perceived relations 
between “Inductives” and “Abductives” (cooperative-competitive, allies-enemies) on a 
10-point scale, and with a high correlation of r=.791 (α=.880). 
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 This measure was administered following the feedback that participants received 
about the interaction between the third party and target outgroup, and before their own 
group expected to interact with the target outgroup. The survey items used here are 
similar to those used in Study 1 in assessing the extent to which participants perceived 
the relation between the third party and target outgroup to be positive or negative.  
Outcome variables 
Expectations for Interaction with the Target Outgroup 
To assess whether their interaction with the third party group impacts their attitudes 
towards a target outgroup, participants indicated whether they felt negatively or 
positively toward their upcoming interaction with the target outgroup. The items used for 
this measure parallel those used in Study 1, but refer to expectations of future 
interactions, rather than actual experiences (e.g, “My interaction with the Abductive 
Group will be [pleasant/hostile/friendly/distant]”; see Barlow et al., 2012; Islam & 
Hewstone, 1993). They provided their responses on a 12-item general evaluation scale, 
with a reliability of α=.819.  
Attitudes toward Target Outgroup 
Another set of four items asked participants to indicate on a scale from “1” to “7”, 
the extent they felt negative/positive, hostile/friendly, cold/warm, and suspicious/trusting 
toward the “Abductive” group, with a high reliability of α=.884. These items also parallel 
the ones used in Study 1. 
Perceived Similarities between the Third Party and Target Outgroup 
To account for the possible mediating effect of perceived similarities between the 
outgroups, as proposed by Pettigrew’s (2009) description of the secondary transfer effect, 
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a single item assessed how similar or different participants perceived the third party and 
target outgroups to be. Responses ranged from “very different” to “very similar” on a 10-
point scale. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Contact and Attitudes toward Third Party “Inductives” 
To check whether the interaction conditions with the third-party “Inductive” 
group influenced participants’ reports on the interaction and their attitudes toward that 
group, a one-way ANOVA was employed. As expected there was a significant effect of 
these primary conditions on participants’ reports of the interaction, F(2,197)=78.26, 
p<.001, η2=.45. Post hoc analyses revealed that those in the “negative” condition reported 
a significantly more negative experience (M =3.40, SD=1.74) with the “Inductive” third 
party than those in the positive condition (M =5.69, SD=.82) , p<.001, and those in the 
neutral condition (M=5.61, SD=.75) , p<.001. However, there was no significant 
difference in reports between those in the “positive” and “neutral” conditions, p=.94.  
Similarly, the condition in which the interaction took place significantly 
influenced the participants’ attitudes toward the “Inductive” third party group, F (2, 196) 
= 58.82, p<.001, η2=.38. Posthoc analysis revealed that participants in the negative 
condition reported less positive attitudes toward the Inductive third party group (M=2.76, 
SD=1.44) as compared to participants in the positive condition (M=5.30, SD=1.60)), 
p<.001, and those in the control condition (M=5.24, SD=1.54), p<.001; no significant 
difference between those in the positive and neutral conditions were found, p=.98.  
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Together, these findings indicate that the “negative” interaction condition resulted 
in more negative responses toward the third party group than the “positive” and “neutral” 
contact conditions. Given that in both cases, the means were considerably above the 
midpoint of the scale (an average of 5.46 on a 7-point scale), this implies that perhaps the 
neutral condition was perceived as positively as the positive condition. 
Perceived Interactions and Relations between Third Party “Inductives” and Target 
Outgroup “Abductives” 
To check whether the false feedback regarding ostensible relations between the 
“Inductive” third party and “Abductive” target outgroups influenced participants’ 
perceptions of that relationship, a one-way ANOVA was employed. The analysis showed 
that the feedback condition significantly influenced participants’ perceptions of the 
perceived interaction, F (2,194) = 35.27, p <.001, η2=.27, and the perceived relation, F 
(2, 194) = 25.72, p <.001, η2=.21 between the “Inductive” and “Abductive” groups. 
Participants in the negative condition perceived less positive interactions (M=3.54, 
SD=1.07) than participants in the positive condition (M=4.70, SD=.82), p<.001, or 
participants in the control condition (M=4.92, SD=1.11) , p<.001. Along similar lines, 
participants in the negative condition perceived less positive relations (i.e., that 
“Inductives” and “Abductives” were more competitive and like enemies, M=4.17, 
SD=2.00) than those in the positive condition (M=6.24, SD=1.78), p<.001, and those in 
the control condition (M=6.48, SD=2.25) , p<.001. Once again, there were no significant 
difference between participants in the positive and control conditions on perceived 
interactions, p=.45, and perceived relations, p=.80. For both outcome measures, mean 
scores in the positive and control conditions are above the midpoint (for perceived 
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interactions, M=4.81 on a 7-point scale, and for perceived relations, M =5.36 on a 10-
point scale), suggesting that relations in the control condition are perceived as positively 
as those in the positive condition. 
Main Outcomes 
Based on the procedures outlined above, this experimental study follows a 3 
(interaction with third party group: positive/negative/neutral) X 3 (perceived relation 
between third party and target outgroup: friendly/hostile/control) factorial design. 
Therefore, a 3 (interaction with third party) X 3 (perceived relations between third party 
and target outgroup) analysis of variance was employed to predict two outcome variables: 
participants’ self-reported attitudes toward the target outgroup and their expectations for 
contact with the target outgroup.  Similar to the expected results for Study 1, an 
interaction between the two predictors was expected, such that participants’ expected 
interactions with the “Abductive” target outgroup and attitudes towards the target 
outgroup will vary in relation to two factors: first, their own experiences with the third 
party group (positive, negative, or control), and the information they receive from the 
experimenter about relations (friendly or hostile) between the third party group and target 
outgroup. The analysis also included perceived similarity as a possible mediator effects 
between the third party and target outgroup. 
Expectations for Interaction with the Target Outgroup 
Mean scores on expectations for contact with the target outgroup across 
experimental conditions are presented in Table 5. Examining first the experimental 
effects on expectations for contact with the “Abductive” target outgroup, results showed 
a significant main effect of the initial interaction with “Inductives”, F(2,191) = 24.07, 
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p<.001, η2=.208. A post hoc Scheffe test revealed that participants who had a negative 
experience with the “Inductive” third party group anticipated a significantly more 
negative experience with the “Abductive” target outgroup (M=3.91, SD=.89), relative to 
those who had a positive experience (M=4.71, SD=1.01, p <.001) or a neutral experience 
(M=4.97, SD=.77, p <.001) with the “Inductive” third party group.  Once again, though, 
there were no significant differences in expectations for contact between those who had 
positive and neutral experiences with the “Inductive” third party group p=.244. 
As for the main effect of perceived relations, the differences were marginally 
significant, F(2, 191)=2.586, p=.078, η2=.027 2. Post hoc analyses show that those who 
received negative information about relations between the third party and target 
outgroups anticipated a significantly more negative interaction with the “Abductive” 
target outgroup (M=4.31, SD=.92) than those who did not receive any information at all 
(control condition; M=4.75, SD=1.11, p=.022. There was no significant difference 
between participants who received positive information about “Inductive-Abductive” 
relations (M=4.56, SD=.92) and the other two conditions. 
Additionally, the analysis found no significant interaction effects between the two 
experimental conditions on expectations for contact with the target outgroup, 
F(4,191)=.45, p=.772, η2=.01.  
Attitudes toward the Target Outgroup 
Mean attitudes toward the target outgroup (“Abductives”) across experimental 
conditions are presented in Table 6. Again, a 3 (interaction with third party) X 3 
(perceived relations between third party and target outgroup) analysis of variance was 
tested in predicting participants’ attitudes toward the “Abductive” target outgroup. This 
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two-way ANOVA again found a main effect of the contact manipulation, F(2,191)=4.71, 
p=.01, η2=.05, such that those in the negative contact condition (M=4.11, SD=1.18) 
reported significantly less positive attitudes toward the “Abductive” target outgroup than 
those participants in the control condition (M=4.76, SD=1.17, p=.013, and marginally less 
positive attitudes than those in the positive contact condition (M=4.62, SD=1.33), p=.069.  
There was no significant main effect of perceived relations on participants’ attitudes 
toward the “abductive” target outgroup, F(2,191)=1.18, p=.310, η2=.013, and the 
interaction effect was not significant, F(4,191)=1,13, p=.344, η2=.024.  
Perceived Similarities 
An additional goal of this paper was to examine the role of the predictor variables 
– in this case, effect of interaction with “Inductives” and perceived “Inductive-
Abductive” relations – beyond the role of perceived similarities between the third party 
“Inductives” and target outgroup “Abductives”, in shaping the perceptions and 
expectations that group members may develop toward the target outgroup. First, looking 
at whether these perceptions were themselves influenced by any of the manipulations, the 
information received about the interactions between “Inductives” and “Abductives” does 
not significantly influence subsequent perceptions of the similarities between these two 
groups, F(2,188)=2.32, p=.101, η2=.025. Interestingly, however, the initial contact that 
participants had with “Inductives” does influence these perceptions, F(2,188)=3.77, 
p=.015, η2=.040. Furthermore, there is a significant interaction effect between the two 
manipulations, F(4,188)=4.05, p=.004, η2=.083. 
 In line with previous results from this study, a Scheffe post hoc test found that 
those who engaged in a negative interaction with “Inductives” later found “Inductives” 
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and “Abductives” to be more different (M=5.02, SD=2.11) than those who engaged in a 
neutral type of interaction (M=5.98, SD=1.96; p=.023) and marginally more so than those 
who engaged in a positive interaction (M=5.77, SD=1.70, p=087). The difference 
between those in the positive and neutral conditions was not significant, p=.862. 
 With respect to the interaction, the differences were found between the negative 
and neutral initial contact experiences. For those who had a negative experience with 
“Inductives”, while they perceived more “Inductive-Abductive” differences than those in 
the neutral (or positive) contact conditions, these perceptions did not significantly vary as 
a function of the feedback they received. On the other hand, those in the neutral contact 
condition, and also experienced a more positive interaction (based on findings reported 
above), perceived those differences to be greater after hearing that “Inductive-Abductive” 
relations are bad (M=5.00, SD=1.76) than when they received no information at all about 
these relations (M=6.88, SD=1.83), F(1,44)=12.21, p=.001, η2=.22. 
 To examine the influence of perceptions of similarity/difference, a regression 
analysis found that these perceptions significantly predicted participants’ expectations of 
their upcoming interactions, such that the more similar they perceived “Inductives” and 
“Abductives” to be, the more positive they expected their upcoming interactions with the 
“Abductives” to be, b=.18, SE=.03, p<.001, controlling for the effects of both 
independent variables (contact experience and feedback). Nevertheless, the two main 
independent variables were still strong predictors of participants’ expectations above and 
beyond the influence of perceived similarity (for contact with “Inductives”, b=.44, 
SE=.07, p<.001; for information about the two groups’ interaction, b=.15, SE=.07, 
p=.04). As for attitude formation, although perceived similarity does predict participant 
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attitudes toward “Abductives”, b=.16, SE=.05, p=.001, the contact experience that takes 
place with “Inductives” remains a strong predictor of attitudes toward “Abductives”, 
above and beyond that of perceived similarity, b=.26, SE=11, p=.02. 
Discussion 
The goal of the experimental study was to examine whether a third party group 
directly causes changes in perceptions of and attitudes toward a target outgroup. To test 
that, three-person groups were formed in a lab, where they interacted with a designated 
“third party”, then received information about the relations between that third party and 
another “target outgroup”, and were subsequently asked to report their expectations for 
contact and attitudes toward that target outgroup. The experiment purposefully allowed 
no contact between the participant group and target outgroup, in order to unambiguously 
identify the source(s) of the attitudes formed toward them. 
The results clearly pointed to a strong influence of contact with the third party 
(“Inductives”) on participants’ expectations and attitudes toward the target outgroup 
(“Abductives”). Specifically, when the interaction with “Inductives” was negative, 
participants had more negative expectations and more negative attitudes toward 
“Abductives” – whom they had not interacted with yet – than when the interaction with 
“Inductives” was positive or neutral. Furthermore, when the information that participants 
received was examined, analysis found that participants who heard that the “Inductive-
Abductive” relationship was negative subsequently reported more negative expectations 
about their upcoming interaction with “Abductives” than those who heard positive 
information or no information at all about the relationship. This manipulation did not 
influence participants’ attitudes toward “Abuctives”, however. 
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More importantly, participants seemed to be more affected by their initial 
interaction with the third party “Inductives’ than by the information they received 
regarding that third party’s experience with the target outgroup “Abductives”. Given the 
setup of the experiment, though, this is not entirely unexpected. To begin with, one would 
expect that direct contact would have a stronger impact in this case, since participants had 
no knowledge about “Deductives”, “Inductives”, or “Abductives” prior to entering the 
experimental session, and thus basing their responses on information obtained within just 
an hour. Second, participants are exposed to the third party and undergo a pleasant, 
unpleasant, or neutral interaction with them for about 15 minutes, whereas they are 
exposed to the information about the “Inductive-Abductive” relationship for less than 
four seconds. Therefore, a manipulation that lasted significantly longer and that also 
required interaction and involved an emotional provocation may more likely influence 
participants’ subsequent responses than a manipulation that was considerably briefer and 
did not require any sort of give-and-take from the participants. This weaker second 
manipulation could also explain why no interaction was found between the two 
independent variables. Future studies should take that into account and ensure that 
participants are exposed to the second manipulation (i.e., information about the 
“Inductive-Abductive” interaction) for a more substantial amount of time, and with more 
substantive detail than a simple “They did/did not get along” statement that would also 
allow for active processing of that information. 
The study also examined the role of perceived similarities. First, information 
about the relationship between the “Inductives” and “Abductives” did not influence how 
similar or different they were perceived to be. Interestingly, though, the interaction that 
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occurred between the participants and “Inductives” did affect these perceptions, such that 
a negative interaction led participants to perceive the “Inductives” and “Abductives” as 
more different than a positive or neutral interaction did. Again, this could be explained by 
the high likelihood that that first manipulation was stronger and more impactful, 
especially when it was negative. It is also possible that participants viewed that particular 
negative contact experience – and by association, that “Inductive” group – as an 
exception and not what is typical in these laboratory settings.3 If participants saw the 
“Inductives” as deviating from the norm, then they might consequently assume that the 
“Inductives” are not a typical representation of other groups in this setting, including the 
“Abductives”. Unfortunately, the study did not measure whether participants found the 
“Inductives” to be a typical or exceptional group, and this potential factor should be 
explored in future studies. 
The study also found that participants’ perceptions of similarities varied when 
they had a neutral contact experience with the “Inductives”. For that subgroup, when they 
were told that the “Inductive-Abductive” contact was negative, they were more likely to 
conclude that these two groups were also more different from each other than when they 
received no information. Therefore, when the interaction was neutral, participants relied 
on the information they received about the “Inductive-Abductive” interaction to inform 
their perceptions of how similar or different these two groups may be. 
Next, when “Inductives” and “Abductives” were perceived to be more similar, 
participant attitudes toward “Abductives” were more positive, across all conditions of the 
experiment. More importantly, however, the interaction with the third-party group still 
played a significant role in shaping participant attitudes toward “Abductives”, above and 
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beyond the influence of perceived similarities. Moreover, both the interaction with 
“Inductives” as well as the perceived “Inductive-Abductive” relation influenced how 
participants anticipated their upcoming interaction with “Abductives” to go, above and 
beyond the role of perceived “Inductive-Abductive” similarities. 
The results of this study are encouraging and indicative of a strong influence of 
third parties, at least in the initial stage. This is reflective of the mechanisms behind 
secondary transfer (Pettigrew, 2009), although the future goal of this research is to focus 
on strengthening the second predictor – relationship between the third party and target 
outgroup – in order to examine the full extent of the role that this additional factor may 
play. Moreover, additional measures could directly ask participants what they based their 
judgments on, regarding the target outgroups. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In sum, the findings from the field survey and experimental study provide partial 
support for the hypotheses of this paper, and strong preliminary support for the role of 
third parties in influencing the way people perceive and feel toward target outgroups. In 
the field survey, it was the relationship and attitudes held by the third party (Palestinians) 
toward the target outgroup (Israelis) that predicted Lebanese respondents’ own attitudes 
and perceptions regarding Israelis. This fits within the political context in Lebanon, a 
place where strong norms and pressures exist concerning people’s stance toward Israelis, 
such that people might only be willing to justify their deviating judgments if they 
perceived – or at least portrayed – the third party Palestinians as a group that has varied 
its judgments as well. Since Palestinians have been the main victims of the conflict with 
Israelis, it may be difficult for the Lebanese to express anything less negative about 
Israelis until Palestinians do so first and provide “permission” for Lebanese to follow 
suit. 
In the experimental study, on the other hand, it was the participants’ interaction 
with the third party that was the main driving force. As mentioned earlier, this is likely 
the result of a considerably powerful first manipulation (contact with “Inductives”) and a 
relatively weaker second manipulation (“Inductive-Abductive” relationship). This could 
be modified in a follow-up study, where more attention would be given to that second 
factor so that it has an equitable impact to that of the first predictor (contact with 
“Inductives”). 
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Moreover, a future study should also examine the predictive role of these factors 
in contexts where direct contact with the target outgroup exists. This scenario is also not 
unlike real-life contexts where all three groups may interact with one another, but where 
the mechanisms that underlie structural balance could still exist. 
Finally, these preliminary findings open the door for additional questions and 
paths that can be examined within multigroup contexts. For instance, would the relative 
status or power of the third party group, with respect to the individual’s group and a 
target outgroup, matter? In other words, would a third party that is seen as having lower 
status than one’s own group still be able to play a strong role in shaping attitudes and 
perceptions toward the target outgroup? Furthermore, would the same mechanisms exist 
in contexts that include more than three groups? How would structural balance manifest 
itself, and how would group members form judgments, if they were faced with multiple 
third parties? These are questions that are well worth examining in future studies within 
this line of research and the author remains excited in pursuing these multiple variables 
and issues that arise when exploring the many facets of third party influence and multiple 
group relations. 
Broader Implications 
There are numerous intergroup contexts in the world that involve more than two 
groups in conflict, where some may establish formal or informal coalitions with other 
groups, while distancing themselves from other groups.  The processes described in this 
paper carry important implications for how members of different groups form  
alliances or enemy relations (see Alexander, Brewer, & Livingston, 2005; Alexander, 
Brewer, & Hermann, 1999). Appraisals of the nature of a relationship, and subsequently 
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kind of threat or opportunities that an outgroup poses, gives rise to distinct emotional 
reactions, which can then lead to the formation of distinct group images (e.g., ally vs. 
enemy), and to distinct action tendencies (e.g., aggression, self-protection) that 
correspond to those images (Alexander et al., 1999; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Hermann 
(1985) noted that the formation of group images falls in line with Heider’s (1958) balance 
theory. To maintain a positive moral image of one’s own group, the cognitive system 
looks at the threat or opportunity presented by the outgroup and draws an image of that 
outgroup that will create balance (Hermann, 1985). What is novel about the research in 
this paper is that it recognizes the existence of more than one group, and how this added 
complexity might inform how we evaluate and form attitudes toward other groups. In 
contexts with multiple groups, members of each group must evaluate their relationship 
with one outgroup, while taking into account that group’s relationship with even other 
outgroups. These factors could illuminate the psychological processes that are involved in 
coalition building, especially in areas with ongoing conflict, and where coalitions and 
alliances serve to enhance a group’s strength and ability to respond to potential threats. 
What also becomes clear from the preceding discussion is that greater research 
attention is needed to understand both positive and negative processes involved in 
intergroup contact.  Research on secondary transfer effects have focused mainly on 
positive effects of attitude transference, and extended contact research has focused 
mainly on positive effects in relation to knowledge of ingroup members’ intergroup 
contact experiences. In reality, attitudes can change drastically and in both positive as 
well as negative directions. In line with previous research (e.g., Barlow et al., 2012; 
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Paolini et al., 2010), the experimental study has shown that negative contact processes 
may have stronger influence on attitudes than positive contact.  
In multi-group settings, where three or more groups are involved, the influence of 
positive as well as negative processes may become more complicated. Not only do 
groups in this context have to contend with the negative contact experiences, attitudes, or 
relations that occur with one group, but with how these processes unfold in the presence 
of a third influential group. In summary, when multiple groups exist, relational dynamics 
become more complex than what the existing literature on intergroup relations presents. 
The current research hopes to have shed some light on the possible factors that may play 
a role in building coalitions and forming attitudes towards multiple groups. 
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Table 1 
 
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations Measures of Contact, Attitudes, and 
Perceived Relations and between Lebanese, Palestinians, and Israelis 
 
 N Mean SD 
Primary Predictor Measures    
Lebanese Attitudes toward Palestinians 370 4.87 1.53 
Perceived Palestinian Attitudes toward Israelis 361 2.18 2.20 
Perceived Lebanese-Palestinian Relations 376 3.66 1.84 
Perceived Palestinian-Israeli Relations 385 .74 1.50 
Secondary Predictor Measures    
Lebanese Contact with Palestinians 234 5.15 .91 
Perceived Palestinian Contact with Israelis 354 1.77 .84 
Perceived Lebanese-Palestinian Similarities 388 4.87 1.64 
Perceived Palestinian-Israeli Similarities 384 2.13 1.94 
Perceived Lebanese-Israeli Similarities 377 1.87 1.82 
Outcome Measures    
Lebanese Attitudes toward Israelis 377 1.96 2.06 
Perceived Lebanese-Israeli Relations 384 .58 1.50 
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Table 2 
 
Correlation Matrix for Measures of Attitudes, Perceived Relations, Perceived 
Similarity, and Contact 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Contact with Pal 1           
2 Attitudes toward Pal .45** 1          
3 Pal. Contact w. Isr -.30** -.20* 1         
4 Pal Attitudes to Isr -.11 .23* .04 1        
5 Leb Attitudes to Isr -.06 .29** -.02 .92** 1       
6 Leb-Pal Relations .19** .02 -.17** -.61** -.55** 1      
7 Pal-Isr Relations -.16* -.11* .07 -.09 -.08 -.22** 1     
8 Leb-Isr Relations -.16* -.02 -.01 -.07 -.04 -.19** .87** 1    
9 Leb-Pal Similarities .28** .54** .22** .28** .33** .16** -.21** -.13* 1   
10 Pal-Isr Similarities -.09 .20** .07** .79** .74** -.64** -.07 -.10* .22** 1  
11 Leb-Isr Similairities -.10 .30** .03 .81** .78** -.61** .06 -.02 .26** .89** 1 
 
Note: For correlations that include direct contact with Palestinians, sample size ranges 
from 197 to 234. With the remaining variables, however, sample size ranged from 229 to 
384. 
** p < .01 (2-tailed); *  p < .05 (2-tailed) 
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Table 3 
 
Logistic Regression Outcome Table for Predicting Lebanese Attitudes toward 
Israelis 
 
 Parameter Estimate SE Wald Exp(B) 
Constant 1.43* .58 6.10 .24 
Attitudes to Palestinians .35** .12 9.33 1.43 
Perceived Pal Attitudes to Israelis 3.95** 1.41 7.88 .02 
Att to Pal X Pal Att to Israelis .18 .25 .51 1.20 
** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table 4 
 
Logistic Regression Outcome Table for Predicting Perceived Relations between 
Lebanese and Israelis 
 
 Parameter Estimate SE Wald Exp(B) 
Constant 1.34* .57 5.51 3.8 
Lebanese-Palestinian Relations .33** .13 6.76 .03 
Palestinian-Israeli Relations 3.49*** .84 17.17 .03 
Leb-Pal Rel X Pal-Isr Rel .25 .18 2.02 3.80 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table 5 
 
Mean scores for expectations for contact following both conditions of interaction 
with “Inductives” and perceived relations of “Inductives” and “Abductives” 
 
DED-IND Interaction IND-ABD Interaction N M SD 
Negative Negative (Enemy) 24 3.79 .696 
Positive (Ally) 21 4.03 1.05 
Control 18 3.92 .94 
Total 63 3.91 .89 
Positive Negative (Enemy) 21 4.43 .98 
Positive (Ally) 21 4.69 .74 
Control 21 5.01 1.20 
Total 63 4.71 1.01 
Neutral Negative (Enemy) 21 4.80 .79 
Positive (Ally) 21 4.95 .69 
Control 24 5.15 .82 
Total 66 4.97 .77 
Total Negative (Enemy) 66 4.31 .92 
Positive (Ally) 63 4.56 .92 
Control 63 4.75 1.11 
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Table 6 
 
Mean scores for attitudes toward “Abductives” following both conditions of 
interaction with “Inductives” and perceived relations of “Inductives” and 
“Abductives” 
 
DED-IND Interaction IND-ABD Interaction N M SD 
Negative Negative (Enemy) 24 4.11 1.14 
Positive (Ally) 21 4.15 1.43 
Control 18 4.10 .96 
Total 63 4.11 1.18 
Positive Negative (Enemy) 21 4.50 1.48 
Positive (Ally) 21 4.60 1.49 
Control 21 4.76 1.01 
Total 63 4.62 1.33 
Neutral Negative (Enemy) 21 4.82 1.03 
Positive (Ally) 21 4.23 1.20 
Control 24 5.17 1.13 
Total 66 4.76 1.17 
Total Negative (Enemy) 66 4.46 1.24 
Positive (Ally) 63 4.33 1.37 
Control 63 4.71 1.12 
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Figure 1: Conceptual model: How attitudes/relations toward a third party and 
perceived relations between the third party and target outgroup are expected to 
predict attitudes/relations toward that target outgroup. 
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution graphs (histograms) depicting Lebanese self-
reports on their attitudes toward Israelis (skewness = 1.89, SD = .13) compared to 
toward Palestinians (skewness = -.49, SD = .13). 
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Figure 3: Binary regression graph depicting Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis as a 
function of their attitudes toward Palestinians and their perceptions of Palestinian 
attitudes toward Israelis. 
 
 
 67 
Figure 4: Binary regression graph depicting perceived Lebanese-Israeli as a 
function of their perceptions of Lebanese-Palestinian and Palestinian-Israeli 
relations. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXCERPTS FROM SURVEY ASSESSING LEBANESE RELATIONS WITH 
PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS 
 
Measures to Test Third-Party Effects 
Lebanese contact with Palestinians. 
Please respond to the following questions based on YOUR experiences and how YOU feel towards 
PALESTINIANS. 
1) Have you had any form of contact with Palestinians?        Yes      No 
If you have answered “No” to question 1, please skip to item 7 
2) If you have had contact with Palestinians, how much contact have you had with Palestinians who live 
in: 
 Not much 
contact      
A great deal 
of contact 
a. Lebanon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. West Bank/Gaza 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Jordan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Other (specify): 
______________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3) If you have had contact with Palestinians, please indicate how often you have had each type of 
contact with Palestinians, using the number that best represents your response. 
 I have never had any form of contact or interaction with Palestinians 
 Almost Never      Almost Always 
e. Face-to-face 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Over the phone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. By email 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Blogospheres/ chat 
rooms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Social network 
website 
(Facebook…) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. Other (specify): 
______________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4) Of the Palestinians you know, how many would you consider to be close friends? 
Almost none of 
them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Almost all of 
them 
        
5)  
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6) Please reflect on your interactions with Palestinians, when responding to the items below: 
 
Almost 
Never   
Some-
times   
Almost 
Always 
How often have you had had POSITIVE 
CONTACT EXPERIENCES with Palestinians? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How often have you had FRIENDLY 
INTERACTIONS with Palestinians? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How often have you had HOSTILE 
INTERACTIONS with Palestinians? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How often have you had NEGATIVE 
CONTACT EXPERIENCES with Palestinians? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7) Please read the following statements and circle the number that corresponds with your level of 
agreement to each statement. 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
  Undecided   
Strongly 
Agree 
1. When I interact with Palestinians the 
contact is almost always pleasant.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. When I interact with Palestinians we 
almost always interact as equals.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. When I interact with Palestinians the 
contact is almost always unpleasant.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. When I interact with Palestinians, 
there are almost always differences 
in power or status.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. When I interact with Palestinians the 
contact is almost always friendly.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. When I interact with Palestinians it 
often feels like we cooperate well 
with each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. When I interact with Palestinians the 
contact is almost always hostile.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. When I interact with Palestinians it 
often feels like we are competing 
with each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. When I interact with Palestinians I 
feel that the contact is intimate like 
being with good friends and family. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. When I interact with Palestinians I 
feel that the contact is distant like 
with strangers or people unknown to 
me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians.   
8) Think about how you feel toward Palestinians in general.   
To what extent do you feel?  (circle number to indicate your response) 
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a. Negative  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Positive  
b. Cold  1   2 3 4 5 6 7 Warm  
c. Hostile  1   2 3 4 5 6 7 Friendly  
d. Suspicious  1   2 3 4 5 6 7 Trusting  
Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis.   
9) Think about how you feel toward Israelis in general.   
To what extent do you feel?  (circle number to indicate your response) 
a. Negative  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Positive  
b. Cold  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Warm  
c. Hostile  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Friendly  
d. Suspicious  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Trusting  
Process variables.   
 Perceived Similarity. 
1) Please indicate below how different or similar these pairs of groups are in terms of political 
ideology: 
Palestinians & Israelis 
Very Different  1     2   3      4       5 6       7     8    9 10          Very Similar 
2) Please indicate below how different or similar these pairs of groups are in terms of cultural 
values: 
Palestinians & Israelis 
       Very Different  1     2   3      4       5 6       7     8    9 10          Very Similar 
3) Please indicate below how different or similar these pairs of groups are in terms of goals and 
interests: 
Palestinians & Israelis 
       Very Different  1     2   3      4       5 6       7     8    9 10          Very Similar 
Perceived Relations. 
4) Please indicate on a scale of 1 -10 the extent to which the groups below are in a cooperative vs. 
competitive relationship: 
Palestinians & Israelis 
       Cooperative  1     2   3      4       5 6       7     8    9 10          Competitive 
5) Please indicate on a scale of 1 -10 the extent to which the groups below have an ally versus 
enemy relationship: 
Palestinians & Israelis 
       Enemy   1     2   3      4       5 6       7     8    9 10          Ally 
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Extended contact between Palestinians and Israelis. 
6) Please respond to the following questions based on the PALESTINIAN people that you know 
 None Few Some Many 
Very 
Many 
How many Palestinians do you know that have had 
POSITIVE CONTACT EXPERIENCES with Israelis? 1 2 3 4 5 
How many Palestinians do you know that have had 
FRIENDLY INTERACTIONS with Israelis? 1 2 3 4 5 
How many Palestinians do you know that have 
developed FRIENDSHIPS with Israelis? 1 2 3 4 5 
How many Palestinians do you know that have had 
HOSTILE INTERACTIONS with Israelis? 1 2 3 4 5 
How many Palestinians do you know that have had 
NEGATIVE CONTACT EXPERIENCES with Israelis? 1 2 3 4 5 
 
7) AMONG THE PALESTINIANS YOU KNOW WHO HAVE HAD CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS, 
WHEN THEY INTERACT WITH ISRAELIS… 
  Strongly 
Disagree   Undecided   
Strongly 
Agree 
1. .. the contact is almost always 
pleasant.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. ..they almost always interact as 
equals.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. .. the contact is almost always 
unpleasant.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. .. there are almost always differences 
in power or status.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. .. the contact is almost always 
friendly.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. .. it often seems like they cooperate 
well with each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. .. the contact is almost always 
hostile.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. .. it often seems like they are 
competing with each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. .. it seems like the contact is intimate 
like being with good friends and 
family. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. .. it seems like the contact is distant 
like with strangers or people 
unknown to THEM. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX B 
ITEMS ASSESSING PARTICIPANT RESPONSES TOWARD EXPERIMENTAL 
THIRD PARTY AND TARGET GROUPS 
 
Measures to Test Third-Party Effects 
Participant contact with third party “deductive” group (manipulation check). 
Please respond to the following questions based on your experiences with the DEDUCTIVE GROUP. 
Please read the following statements and circle the number that corresponds with your level of agreement 
to each statement. 
  Strongly 
Disagree   Undecided   
Strongly 
Agree 
1. My interaction with the Deductive 
Group was pleasant.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My interaction with the Deductive 
Group was as equals.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. My interaction with the Deductive 
Group was unpleasant.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My interaction with the Deductive 
Group was based on differences in 
power or status.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My interaction with the Deductive 
Group was friendly.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I felt like we cooperate well with 
each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. My interaction with the Deductive 
Group was hostile.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I felt like we were competing with 
each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I felt like the interaction was intimate 
like being with good friends. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I felt that the contact is distant like 
with strangers or people unknown to 
me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I had a positive experience with the 
Deductive Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I had a negative experience with the 
Deductive Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Participant attitudes toward the “Deductive” group.   
13) Think about how you feel toward the Deductive Group.   
To what extent do you feel?  (circle number to indicate your response) 
a. Negative  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Positive  
b. Cold  1   2 3 4 5 6 7 Warm  
c. Hostile  1   2 3 4 5 6 7 Friendly  
d. Suspicious  1   2 3 4 5 6 7 Trusting  
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Participant attitudes toward the target “Abductive” group.   
14) Think about how you feel toward the Abductive Group.   
To what extent do you feel?  (circle number to indicate your response) 
a. Negative  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Positive  
b. Cold  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Warm  
c. Hostile  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Friendly  
d. Suspicious  1   2 3 4 5 6 7  Trusting  
 
Participant Inductive Group anticipated contact with target Abductive Group. 
Please reflect on your upcoming interactions with the Abductive Group, when responding to the items 
below: 
Please read the following statements and circle the number that corresponds with your level of agreement 
to each statement. 
  
Strongly 
Disagree   Undecided   
Strongly 
Agree 
1. My interaction with the Abductive 
Group will be pleasant.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My interaction with the Abductive 
Group will be as equals.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. My interaction with the Abductive 
Group will be unpleasant.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My interaction with the Abductive 
Group will be based on differences 
in power or status.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My interaction with the Abductive 
Group will be friendly.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I feel like we will cooperate well 
with each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. My interaction with the Abductive 
Group will be hostile.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I feel like we will be competing with 
each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I feel like the interaction will be 
intimate like being with good 
friends. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I feel that the contact will be distant 
like with strangers or people 
unknown to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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11. I will have a positive experience 
with the Abductive Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I will have a negative experience 
with the Abductive Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Perceived Similarity between the third party “Deductive” and target “Abductive” groups. 
27) Please indicate below how different or similar you believe the “Deductive” and “Abductive” 
Groups are: 
Very Different  1     2   3      4       5 6       7     8    9 10          Very Similar 
Process variables (Manipulation Checks).   
 Perceived Relations between the third party “Deductive” and target “Abductive” groups. 
28) Please indicate on a scale of 1 -10 the extent to which the “Deductive” and “Abductive” Groups 
have a cooperative vs. competitive relationship: 
       Cooperative  1     2   3      4       5 6       7     8    9 10          Competitive 
29) Please indicate on a scale of 1 -10 the extent to which they may be allies versus enemies with one 
another relationship: 
       Enemy   1     2   3      4       5 6       7     8    9 10          Ally 
Perceived extended contact between third party (“Deductive”) and target “Abductive” groups. 
Please think about the Deductive Group and their experiences with the Abductive Group when responding 
to the items below. 
WHEN THE DEDUCTIVE and ABDUCTIVE GROUPS INTERACTED WITH EACH OTHER… 
  Strongly 
Disagree   Undecided   
Strongly 
Agree 
1. .. the contact was pleasant.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. ..they interacted as equals.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. .. the contact was unpleasant.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. .. there were differences in power or 
status.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. .. the contact was friendly.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. .. it seems like they cooperated well 
with each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. .. the contact was hostile.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. .. it seems like they were competing 
with each other.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. .. it seems like the contact was 
intimate like being with good 
friends. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. .. it seems like the contact was distant 
like with strangers or people 
unknown to THEM. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. … the contact was positive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. … the contact was negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX C 
FIELD SURVEY – TREATING CONSTRUCTS AS CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
 
Below are the results of linear regression analyses that parallel analyses 
conducted through binary logistic regression, which treat some constructs as dichotomous 
rather than continuous. It is worth mentioning, though, that both types of analyses yielded 
very similar results and this provide confidence in the results provided in both sections of 
the paper.  
The overall model included both predictors (Lebanese attitudes toward 
Palestinians and perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis) and their interaction 
term, with adjusted R2 = .86. First, perceived attitudes of Palestinians toward Israelis 
significantly predicted Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, b=.68, SE=.08, p<.001. In other 
words, with every one unit increase in respondents’ perceptions of positive Palestinian 
attitudes toward Israelis, respondents’ own positive attitudes toward Israelis increased at 
a rate of .68. However, the main effect of attitudes toward Palestinians did not uniquely 
predict attitudes toward Israelis, b=.02, SE=.04, p=.65. Nevertheless, there is a significant 
interaction effect of these two predictor variables, b=.036, SE=.01, p=.005.  When 
Palestinians are perceived to hold more negative attitudes toward Israelis (i.e., when 
respondents scored these attitudes as low as “1”), Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis 
remain negative as well, regardless of their attitudes toward Palestinians, b=.05, SE=.03, 
p=.08. However, when Palestinians were perceived to hold more positive attitudes toward 
Israelis (i.e., when respondents scored these attitudes as higher than “1”), the more 
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positively respondents felt toward Palestinians, the more positively they felt toward 
Israelis, b=.91, SE=.13, p<.001 (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Regression graph depicting Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis as a function of 
their attitudes toward Palestinians and their perceptions of Palestinian attitudes toward 
Israelis. 
 
The next regression model examined both Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians 
and perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations as predictors for Lebanese attitudes toward 
Israelis, as well as their interaction term, adjusted R2 = .09. The zero-order correlation 
above had already revealed that perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations did not correlate 
with Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, β=.08, p=.12 and thus, as expected, the 
regression shows that perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations does not significantly predict 
Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, b=.34, SE=.22, p=.13. Similarly reflecting the zero-
order correlations obtained, attitudes toward Palestinians significantly predicted Lebanese 
attitudes toward Israelis, b=.54, SE=.11, p<.001. This would imply that overall, with 
every one unit increase in respondents’ positive attitudes toward Palestinians, their 
Perceived Palestinian 
Attitudes toward Israelis 
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positive attitudes toward Israelis increased at a rate of .54. Moreover, the interaction 
effect in this model is marginally significant, b = -.08, SE=.04, p=.06. However, the 
previous regression analysis demonstrated that the relationship between respondents’ 
attitudes toward Palestinians and their attitudes toward Israelis in fact varies as a function 
of perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis. Therefore, an interpretation of results 
that does not include that moderator (perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis) must 
be performed with caution. 
In addition, although perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations do not predict 
respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis, the zero-order correlation showed a significant 
relation between perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations and Lebanese-Israeli relations. 
Therefore, the following section examines the extent that respondents perceive all 
relations between multiple groups within a framework of structural balance. 
Predicting Perceived Relations between Lebanese and Israelis.  To test the 
presence of structural balance for the three groups, perceived relations between each pair 
(Lebanese-Palestinians; Palestinians-Israelis; Lebanese-Israelis) were examined. 
Correlational analysis (found in Table 2) indicate that the more Lebanese and Palestinians 
were perceived as allies, the more Lebanese and Israelis were perceived as enemies, r = -
.19, p < .001. Furthermore, the more Palestinians and Israelis were perceived as enemies, 
the more Lebanese and Israelis were also perceived as enemies, r = .87, p < .001. 
However, when both variables and their interaction term were entered into a regression 
equation (adjusted R2= .72), findings show that perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations are 
significant predictors of perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=.96, SE=.07, p<.001, 
whereas perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations no longer predict perceived Lebanese-
 78 
Israeli relations, b=.03, SE=.03, p=.30. In addition, when controlling for the two main 
effects, there was no significant interaction effect of perceived Lebanese-Palestinian 
Relations X Palestinian-Israeli Relations, b=.03, SE=.02, p=.15. Therefore, we conclude 
that the way respondents perceive Lebanese-Israeli relations depends on the way they 
perceive Palestinian-Israeli relations, but perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations do not 
play any role in the prediction (see Figure 6 below). 
Figure 6: Linear regression graph depicting perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations as a 
function of perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations and perceived Palestinian-Israeli 
relations. 
 
Adding Perceived Similarity as a Predictor. The purpose of asking respondents 
about their perceptions of similarities between groups was to assess the role that group 
similarities might play when it comes to third party influence. Correlations presented in 
Table 2 show that perceived similarities between Palestinians and Israelis is positively 
correlated with Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, r=.74, p<.001. Furthermore, perceived 
Lebanese-Israeli relations were negatively correlated with perceived Lebanese-
Perceived Palestinian-
Israeli Relations 
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Palestinian similarities, b=-.13, p=.012, but not significantly correlated with perceived 
Palestinian-Israeli or Lebanese-Israeli similarities. The hypothesis of this paper posits 
that the effects of perceived attitudes and relations between Palestinians and Israelis will 
be observed beyond the role of perceived similarity. This was tested with both outcome 
variables, attitudes toward Israelis and perceived relations between Lebanese and 
Israelis. First, “Palestinian-Israeli similarities” was entered into a regression equation 
with “perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis”. This model was a better fit for the 
data than a model containing “perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis” alone, 
change in R2= .002, F(1,341)=4.01, p =.046. Controlling for Palestinian-Israeli 
similarities, perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis strongly predicted 
respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis, b=.86, SE=03, p<.001. More importantly, the semi-
partial correlation for this predictor only drops to r=.53 (from a zero-order correlation of 
.92). On the other hand, while controlling for these perceived attitudes, we find that 
perceived Palestinian-Israeli similarity also predicts attitudes toward Israelis, b=.07, 
SE=.04, p=.046. However, the partial correlation here drops to r=.04 (from a zero-order 
r=.75), indicating that perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis are stronger than 
perceived Palestinian-Israeli similarities in predicting respondents’ attitudes toward 
Israelis. 
 As for the role of perceived Palestinian-Israeli similarities on perceptions of 
Lebanese-Israeli relations, including this measure in a regression with Palestinian-Israeli 
relations does not improve the model, change in R2=.002, F(1, 379) = 2.67, p=.10. 
Perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations is still a strong predictor of perceived Lebanese-
Israeli relations, b=.87, SE=.03, p<.001, such that the more respondents feel that 
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Palestinians and Israelis are enemies, the more they also feel that Lebanese and Israelis 
are enemies, adjusted R2 = .75. Once again, the semi-partial correlation in this case 
merely drops to r=.86 (from a zero-order r=.87). However, while controlling for 
perceived relations, perceived similarity between Palestinians and Israelis does not have a 
significant influence on the perceived relations between them, b=-.03, SE=.02, p=.10, and 
the semi-partial correlation is r= -.04 (from a zero-order r=-.10). These two findings 
indicate that perceived Palestinian attitudes toward or relations with Israelis are stronger 
predictors of respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis and perceived relations Lebanese-
Israeli relations, respectively, above and beyond the influence of perceived Palestinian-
Israeli similarities. 
Adding Extended Contact as a Predictor. Secondary processes such as “third-party” 
extended contact were assessed by asking participants to report their knowledge of 
members of the third-party group’s (Palestinians’) contact experiences with the target 
outgroup (Israelis). A linear regression analysis reveals that Palestinian contact 
experiences with Israelis did not significantly predict Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, 
b= -.05, SE = .13, p .72 or perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=.02, SE=.10, p=.86. 
Nonetheless, we tested whether extended contact may contribute to predicting Lebanese 
attitudes toward Israelis, beyond what could be predicted by perceived Palestinian 
attitudes or relations with Israelis. Hence, when this measure (perceived Palestinian 
contact with Israelis) was included in the model with perceived Palestinian attitudes 
toward Israelis, the model showed a significant improvement R2 change =.003, F(1,334), 
=6.07, p=.014. Furthermore, in this model, perceived extended contact between 
Palestinians and Israelis significantly predicted Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, b= -
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.12, SE=.06, p=.04, such that more positive perceived contact between Palestinians and 
Israelis predicted more negative Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis. When included with 
perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations in the model predicting Lebanese attitudes toward 
Israelis, however, there was no significant improvement of fit, R2 change <.000, 
F(1,336), = .02, p=.089. Nevertheless, the same model predicting perceived Lebanese-
Israeli relations showed a significant improvement over one that only included perceived 
Palestinian-Israeli relations. While perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations remains a 
stronger predictor, b=.90, SE=03, p<.001, perceived Palestinian contact with Israelis is 
able to account for some of the remaining variance, b=-.10, .05, p=.02.4 
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APPENDIX D 
NOTES 
 1 The specific variables are: (1) perceived Palestinian contact with Israelis, (2) 
perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis, (3) respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis, 
(4) perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis, (5) perceived relations between 
Lebanese and Israelis, (6) perceived similarities between Palestinians and Israelis, and (7) 
perceived similarities between Lebanese and Israelis. 
 
2 When not controlling for “contact with inductives” as an interacting variable, the 
effect of the perceived Inductive-Abductive relationship becomes significant, 
F(2,191)=3.196, p=.043, η2=.033. 
 
3 To support this, a comparison of how participants felt toward the “inductives” 
before and after the interaction reveals a significant difference, such that for the subgroup 
who went through the negative interaction, their scores on the thermometer dropped two 
points (on a 7-point scale) after the interaction (pre-interaction m=4.76, sd=1.50; post-
interaction m=2.77, sd=1.45), t(64)= -8.26, se=.24, p<.001). On the other hand, attitudes 
toward “inductives” improved following a positive and neutral interaction, t(130)=4.83, 
se=.13, p<.001. 
 
4 Extended contact was tested in other models, where it did not significantly 
predict any of the outcome variables, except in the cases stated above, where the direction 
was opposite of what the paper proposes. Due to these inconsistencies, interpreting 
results related to this measure require further examination of the data, pertaining to 
possible moderators (e.g., this influence may be mediated by perceived Lebanese-
Palestinian relations, which is negatively correlated with Palestinian-Israeli contact, r= -
.17, p=.001). Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this dissertation but will be 
examined in future work. 
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